


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THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

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
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FACTS ABOUT THE FILIPINOS

AS FOUND IN UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS AND OTHER AUTHENTIC
PUBLICATIONS.

The Philippine Information Society aims to place within reach of the American people the most reliable and authoritative evidence attainable in regard to the people of the Philippine Islands and our relations to them. The publications issued will be in no sense expressions of opinion and will be compiled chiefly from Government documents and furnished with full references.

If those of whatever shade of opinion who find our mediation unsatisfactory, or who are not convinced of our success in getting the whole story, will appeal from us to the original sources of information, our object of promoting a knowledge of the facts will be only the more effectively secured. We shall be grateful for any criticism or information convicting us of the omission of any important evidence, and will endeavor to profit thereby in future editions.

The topics to be dealt with in the first ten issues are as follows:

1. The Islands and the People.
2. Our Relations with the Insurgents prior to the Fall of Manila, August, 1898. Were Promises made to Aguinaldo?
3. The Insurgent Government of 1898. The Crucial Test.
4. Aguinaldo and the American Generals, August, 1898, to January, 1899. The Parting of the Ways.
5. Iloilo: An Episode of January, 1899, and Incidents leading up to the Outbreak of Hostilities. Crossing the Rubicon.
6. Outbreak of Hostilities, February 4, 1899, and Seeking an Armistice, April and May, 1899.
7. Luzon Campaign of 1899.
8. Taking the Southern Islands, February, 1899, to July, 1900.
9. Six Months of Guerrilla Warfare, January to July, 1900.
10. Quenching the Embers, July, 1900, to July, 1901.

TABLE OF DATES.

Battleship Maine destroyed	Feb. 15, 1898.
Meeting between Consul Pratt and Aguinaldo	April 24, 1898.
Dewey cables for Aguinaldo to join him	April 24, 1898.
War with Spain declared	April 26, 1898.
Battle of Manila Bay	May 1, 1898.
Aguinaldo brought down by U. S. S. McCulloch	May 19, 1898.
Military Government of Filipinos organized	June 18, 1898.
Revolutionary Government of Filipinos organized	June 23, 1898.
First American Troops landed under command of General Anderson	June 30, 1898.
Filipino Republic proclaimed	July 3, 1898.
General Merritt arrives	July 25, 1898.
Filipinos, on request, withdraw part of Troops surrounding Manila	July 29, 1898.
Peace Protocol signed; Peace declared between Spain and United States	Aug. 12, 1898.
Spaniards surrender Manila	Aug. 13, 1898.
Insurgents evacuate Suburbs of Manila	Sept. 15, 1898.
Filipino Congress meets at Malolos	Sept. 15, 1898.
Meeting of Peace Commission at Paris	Oct. 1, 1898.
Spanish Commissioners accept offer of \$20,000,000	Nov. 28, 1898.
Treaty of Peace agreed to in Paris	Dec. 10, 1898.
Orders sent from Washington for Iloilo Expedition	Dec. 23, 1898.
Spanish Garrison at Iloilo surrenders to the Filipinos	Dec. 24, 1898.
Congress at Malolos adjourns	Dec. 26, 1898.
Americans demand surrender of Iloilo	Dec. 28, 1898.
President's Cablegram Asserting United States Sovereignty	Dec. 21, 1898.
Revised Cablegram Proclaimed by General Otis	Jan. 4, 1899.
Aguinaldo's Counter Proclamation	Jan. 5, 1899.
Constitution of Filipino Republic Adopted	Jan. 21, 1899.
Outbreak of Hostilities at Manila	Feb. 4, 1899.
Treaty Ratified by United States Congress	Feb. 6, 1899.
Treaty Becomes Law	April 11, 1899.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION.	
How Widespread was the Desire for Independence?	7
Could Conciliation Have Avoided War?	9
Who began Hostilities?	11
 I. FIRST NEWS OF THE OUTBREAK.	
1. Cables from United States Officials	13
2. Statements by the Filipinos	14
A. Representatives in Washington	14
B. Junta in Hongkong	14
C. Junta in Europe	15
D. Aguinaldo's Proclamations	16
 II. LATER ACCOUNTS OF THE OUTBREAK.	
1. Secretary Root's Account	19
2. Account of the Schurman Commission	20
3. Account of John Foreman	23
4. Account of Frederic H. Sawyer	24
 III. STATEMENTS OF OUR COMMANDING OFFICERS.	
1. Account of General Otis	25
2. Account of General MacArthur	27
3. Further Evidence Forwarded by General Otis	30
4. Later Report from General Otis	31
 IV. DID AGUINALDO APPLY FOR CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES?	
1. First Cable from General Otis	37
2. Statement of General C. McC. Reeve	38
3. General Otis's Reply Cablegram	40
4. Later Statement by General Otis	41
 V. ORDER OF FEBRUARY FIFTEENTH	
44	
 VI. FILIPINO VERSION OF AMERICANS	
48	
 VII. MABINI'S MANIFESTO	
50	
 APPENDICES.	
A. Federated Malay States	55
B. General Whittier's Interview with Aguinaldo	65
C. Extract from letter of John F. Bass	68

OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

FEBRUARY 4, 1899.

INTRODUCTION.

It will presumably be admitted that the important question with regard to the Outbreak of Hostilities, February 4, 1899, is not, who fired the first shot, but who was responsible for the conditions that made it evident to every observer weeks before the clash came that a single shot might bring on war. The strained situation is illustrated in the following letter* from a soldier, written December 24, 1898: "Have been very busy recently, as there have been almost daily (and senseless) alarms that the insurgents were going to make an attack. At this writing I believe it only a matter of time when there will be a clash, for the two armies' outposts are within a mile or two of each other, and a single shot from either side would precipitate a general engagement."

The situation may be briefly explained as follows: We believed that the Philippine Archipelago was and ought to be ours, and we were moving to take possession as rapidly as possible. The Filipinos, or at least Aguinaldo's government and followers, believed that the country was theirs and they resented every effort on our part to occupy it. We considered it ours through cession from Spain and right of conquest. They claimed that Spain no longer held possession of the country and therefore had no right to cede it to us; moreover, that by right of conquest we were entitled only to temporary occupation of Manila. We wished to extend our sovereignty throughout the Archipelago with all possible dispatch. They desired independence, or at least a protec-

* Printed on page 1534 of the Congressional Record for the 55th Congress, 2d Session.

torate which, while securing them from foreign aggression, should leave them control of their internal affairs.

While a discussion of the justice of either position does not come within the limits of the present inquiry, it is important to remember that from the first a minority in this country urged that the Filipinos were entitled to a promise of ultimate independence, and that a resolution of Congress, similar to that passed in the case of Cuba, would avert all occasion for war. This course having been rejected by our country, the question arises, did the assertion of United States sovereignty render war inevitable?

How Widespread was the Desire for Independence?

The testimony before the Paris Commissioners was practically unanimous to the effect that the number of Filipinos who wanted to rule their own country was exceedingly small, and that while Aguinaldo would be opposed to American rule he would not have an extensive backing. No evidence of a contrary nature is reported. The following extracts from cables sent from Paris to Washington give the substance of the information on this point gained by the Commission:

[MAJOR BOURNS.] "Thinks if a few ambitious insurgent chieftains could be disposed of, masses of natives could be managed by the United States." *

"Natives do not desire independence. Present rebellion represents only half of one per centum of inhabitants. Only 30,000 rebels." †

"Natives could not resist 5,000 troops." ‡

"The United States might have conflicts with the church, but not with the people." §

* Senate Document 148, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., page 18. Major Bourns' views are, according to General Merritt, entitled to a great deal of weight.

† Ibid., page 19. Statement of Belgian consul, to whose opinion much weight was attached.

‡ Ibid., page 19. Statement of General Merritt.

§ Ibid., page 20. Statement of General Merritt.

"General Merritt thinks that if the United States attempted to take possession of Luzon or all the groups as a colony, Aguinaldo and his immediate followers would resist it, but his forces are divided, and his opposition would not amount to anything."*

As late as October 19, General Otis cabled from Manila: "Do not anticipate trouble with insurgents."†

On the other hand, Paymaster Wilcox and Cadet Leonard R. Sargent of the United States Navy, who with Admiral Dewey's permission travelled extensively throughout Luzon during October and November, 1898, reported conditions in the interior greatly at variance with the evidence before the Treaty Commissioners. In the official report of their journey they say the natives "all declare they will accept nothing short of independence,‡ and that they unite in asserting "whatever our government may have done for them it has not gained the right to annex them."§

The report further states, "The Philippine Government has an organized military force in every province we have visited."||

"There are rifles enough for all, principally Remingtons, but many Mausers."||

"Colonel Tirona claimed that 200,000 men from all the islands could be put on the field well armed, and several other officers have independently given the same figures."||

Whatever may have been the extent of the desire for independence in the early months of insurgent rule, it is certain that before the outbreak the feeling had spread far. General Otis, who, in October had anticipated no trouble, reports that in January "the mass of the people were intoxicated with the cry for independence."¶

* Senate Document 148, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., page 20. Statement of General Merritt.

† Ibid., page 29.

‡ Senate Document 66, 56th Cong. 1st. Sess., page 42.

§ Ibid.

|| Ibid., page 43. For fuller extracts see Pamphlet III. of this series.

¶ Otis Report for 1899, page 164.

He states that "Even the women of Cavite province, in a document numerously signed by them, gave me to understand that after all the men were killed off, they were prepared to shed their patriotic blood for the liberty and independence of their country." *

Even in Iloilo, the chief city of the Visayan group, 300 miles from the capital of the Philippine Government at Malolos, the people professed to be bound to support the revolutionary government by the "sacred and natural bonds of blood, language, uses, customs, ideas, sacrifices," † and acted in accordance with these professions.

Could Conciliation Have Avoided War?

Whether the loyalty which the Filipinos professed for their government in its early stages would have continued, is a question that must remain forever unanswered. No doubt most Americans believe that left to themselves the Filipinos would soon have lapsed into anarchy, while a few maintain that with temporary assistance in international affairs they would have developed a government better suited to their peculiar needs than we can ever give them. Still others who are familiar with the Filipinos and kindred races believe that their aspiration for an independent national existence was not deep rooted, that had we adopted an affectionate, admiring tone to their leaders, had we recognized their government and approved of it, we could soon have made their government our government, could have been as sovereign as we pleased, and had the people with us. ‡

Whatever view one may hold, it must be admitted that if we

* Otis Report for 1899, page 70.

† Senate Document 208, 56th Cong. 1st Sess., page 55. See also Pamphlet VI. of this series.

‡ On this point see letters of Sir Andrew Clarke and Sir Frank Swettenham, Appendix A to this Pamphlet.

were to establish our sovereignty by peaceful methods it was essential to win the confidence and affection of the Filipinos. This fact was recognized by President McKinley, who said in his cablegram of December 21, 1898, "Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines." Whether the rank and file of our army with whom the Filipinos came in constant contact were inspired with the same desire is open to doubt.* We are told that when our troops first landed they were met with the greeting which translated means, "American and Filipino equal." We are also told that that salutation ceased to be heard after a little time.

It seems clear, however, that the insurgent leaders could, to some extent, control their followers, and that had we won the good will of the leaders themselves the mass of the people would have trusted us. It is, of course, possible, that the leaders were so bent upon the one thing we were unwilling to grant them that conciliation was out of the question; it does not appear, however, that any very reasonable efforts at conciliation were made, or any great tact or understanding shown.

There is every indication that the Filipinos were prepared, at first, to treat us as friends and liberators. General Anderson tells the following interesting story: †

"The prevailing sentiment of the Filipinos towards us can be shown by one incident.

"About the middle of July the insurgent leaders in Cavite invited a number of our army and navy officers to a banquet. There was some post-prandial speech-making, the substance of the Filipino talk being that they wished to be annexed but not conquered. One of our officers in reply assured them that we had not come to make them slaves, but to make them free men. A singular scene followed. All the Filipinos rose

* In this connection see testimony of Generals Otis and Anderson and Mr. John Foreman, printed in Pamphlet V. of this series.

† *North American Review* for February, 1900, page 277.

to their feet, and Buencomeno, taking his wine-glass in his hand, said: 'We wish to be baptized in that sentiment.' Then he and the rest poured the wine from their glasses over their heads."

After the very first, however, the cultivation of intimate relations with the Filipino leaders seems to have been considered unimportant or inadvisable. General Merritt states that he never saw Aguinaldo. Social intercourse between our officers and the Filipinos was discouraged by General Otis. In fact, after the surrender of Manila, General Whittier seems to have been the only one of our superior officers who ever had a personal interview with Aguinaldo.*

General Otis stated December 30, 1898, "Conditions here at Manila and character of inhabitants not understood in the United States." In the light of after events it would seem as if the instructions that went out to Manila from the United States justified this comment of General Otis's.

Certainly after the proclamation of January 4,† war could only have been avoided by a decisive action of Congress promising ultimate independence to the Filipinos. That proclamation of January 4 raised the issue and provoked the counter proclamation of January 5, which so stirred the people against us—a proclamation in which Aguinaldo once and a thousand times and with all the energy of his soul protested against American sovereignty, and which closed with the words, "upon their heads be all the blood which may be shed."

Who began Hostilities?

With regard to the actual outbreak of hostilities, there is a sharp difference of opinion. The United States press dispatches announcing the outbreak, and the contempora-

* For account of this interview, see Appendix B to this pamphlet.

† For unamended form of this proclamation see Pamphlet VI. of this series, Appendix A.

neous newspaper statements by the Filipinos given below, are of interest as evidence that from the very first each side claimed the other to be the aggressor. As to which of these opposing claims is borne out by the facts, the editors would say that after careful study of all the accessible evidence they find that according to the most authoritative statements the outbreak occurred as the result of a trespass by four armed Filipinos on territory admitted by the Filipino in command to be within the jurisdiction of the United States.* The action of the Filipino trespassers seems to have been an instance of bad discipline in the insurgent army. Certainly it was not ordered on that date by the insurgent leaders, although the indications are that the leaders had planned to attack in a few days. The claim that our forces instigated the attack for the purpose of securing the votes necessary to ratify the treaty is absolutely unsupported by any evidence which has come to the attention of the editors.

* See letter from Filipino officer, page 29 below.

I. FIRST NEWS OF THE OUTBREAK.

1. Cables from United States Officials.*

"WASH. Feb. 5. The following official dispatches were made public to-day :

" *Manila*, February 5th.

" TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, *Washington* :

" Insurgents here inaugurated general engagement, yesterday night, which was continued to-day. The American Army and Navy is generally successful. Insurgents have been driven back and our line advanced. No casualties to Navy.

" DEWEY.

" *Manila*, February 5.

" TO GENERAL GREELY,

" *Chief Signal Officer* :

" Action continues since early morning : losses quite heavy : everything favorable to our arms.

" THOMPSON.

" Colonel Thompson is the chief signal officer on the staff of General Otis.

" *Manila*, February 5.

" ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington* :

" Insurgents in large force opened attack on our outer lines at 8.45 o'clock last evening : renewed attack several times during night : at 4 o'clock this morning entire line engaged : all attacks repulsed. At daybreak advanced against insurgents and have driven them beyond the lines they formerly occupied, capturing several villages and their defence works. Insurgent loss in dead and wounded large : our own casualties thus far estimated at 175, very few fatal. Troops enthusiastic and acting fearlessly. Navy did splendid execution on

* New York *Tribune*, Monday, February 6, 1899.

flanks of enemy. City held in check and absolute quiet prevails. Insurgents have secured good many Mauser rifles, a few field pieces and quick-firing guns, with ammunition during last month.

"OTIS."

2. Statements by the Filipinos.

A. *Representatives in Washington.*

"WASHINGTON, February 5. Dr. Juan Luna, a member of the Filipino Junta here, to-night discredited the statement emanating from Aguinaldo's London representatives.

"He said that he had received a cable from Aguinaldo last night stating that he was awaiting the action of the United States Senate on the Treaty of Peace, and that the Filipinos would make no move until action had been taken. This message, he said, was dated Malolos, the capital of the so-called Filipino Republic." *

"The second statement says : †

"General Aguinaldo had given special orders to the commanders to prevent hostilities unless the Americans violated their agreement by forcing the Filipino lines."

B. *Junta in Hong Kong.‡*

"HONG KONG, Feb. 6.

"The Filipino Junta here gives publicity to the following account of events at Manila :

"The reports of serious fighting at Manila are false. There has been only a skirmish between the outposts due to the deliberate and overt acts of Americans designed to provoke hostilities before the final vote in the Senate to-day."

* New York *Tribune*, February 6.

† Ibid., February 7.

‡ London *Times*, February 7.

C. Junta in Europe.

"The President of the Filipino Junta in Europe made the following statement* yesterday to a representative of Reuter's Agency: —

"In the first place it is perfectly clear that the unfortunate hostilities at Manila were occasioned by an attempt on the part of the Nebraska regiment to find a pretext to obtain control of the Singalon waterworks in San Juan del Monte, which furnish the water supply to the whole capital. For months past, the Americans have endeavored to induce the Filipinos to withdraw their advance line so as to enable the Americans to control the waterworks, but the insurgents, knowing the immense strategic importance of the place, naturally declined to do so. As soon as the fighting broke out, the Americans marched straight to Santa Mesa, which is about half way from the river to the waterworks. Before proceeding to the waterworks they got to the rear of the insurgent troops and took the riverside suburbs of Padacan, Paco and Santa Ana, then, having protected their flank, marched to the waterworks. By the destruction of the villages between the sea and the river bank the Americans have succeeded in leaving a vast open space from which Manila city might previously have been attacked. The strategic point on the north side of the city is Caloocan, its importance being due to the fact that it is the station on the railway line to which Aguinaldo and his troops can come in six hours from Malolos. The Americans seem to have control of the Malolos tramway which is only a very short distance. As the Americans have secured the waterworks the Filipinos will now have to retire to the mountains of San Arates and Boso Boso, which, only an hour distant, command the capital. From these mountains it will be impossible to dislodge them. It is unlikely that Aguinaldo will come to Manila. With the American ships in the harbor the insurgents fully recognize that the occupation of Manila and its

* London Times, February 8.

suburbs is only a question of time. The whole of the Filipino strength will now be devoted to the protection of their country outside Manila. The Americans will have to depend on their food supply from abroad, as the force holding the mountains around Manila will effectually cut off supplies from the interior.

"It only remains for me to deny the statements that Agoncillo ever advised or instigated hostilities. On the contrary, he and the European junta have never ceased to advise Aguinaldo not to commence hostilities. At the same time it was felt by the Filipino leaders in Manila that the attempt to land American re-inforcements was nothing but a threat, and this, added to the unwise proclamation of General Otis refusing all political rights to the natives and inaugurating a military regime had further inflamed native opinion."

D. Aguinaldo's Account in his Proclamations declaring War.

FIRST PROCLAMATION.*

"Nine o'clock p. m., this date, I received from Caloocan station a message communicated to me that the American forces, without prior notification or any just motive, attacked our camp at San Juan del Monte and our forces garrisoning the blockhouses around the outskirts of Manila, causing losses among our soldiers, who, in view of this unexpected aggression and of the decided attack of the aggressors were obliged to defend themselves until the firing became general all along the line.

"No one can deplore more than I this rupture of hostilities. I have a clear conscience that I have endeavored to avoid it at all costs, using all my efforts to preserve friendship with the army of occupation, even at the cost of not a few humiliations and many sacrificed rights.

"But it is my unavoidable duty to maintain the integrity of the national honor and that of the army so unjustly

* Senate Document 208, 56th Congress, 1st Sess., page 104.

attacked by those who, posing as our friends and liberators, attempted to dominate us in place of the Spaniards, as is shown by the grievances enumerated in my manifest of January 8th last: such as the continued outrages and violent exactions committed against the people of Manila, the useless conferences, and all my frustrated efforts in favor of peace and concord.

"Summoned by this unexpected provocation, urged by the duties imposed upon me by honor and patriotism and for the defense of the nation intrusted to me, calling on God as a witness of my good faith and the uprightness of my intentions —

"I order and command:

"1. Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occupation are broken, and the latter will be treated as enemies, with the limits prescribed by the laws of war.

"2. American soldiers who may be captured by the Philippine forces will be treated as prisoners of war.

"3. This proclamation shall be communicated to the accredited consuls of Manila, and to Congress, in order that it may accord with the suspension of the constitutional guaranties and the resulting declaration of war.

"Given at Malolos February 4, 1899.

"EMILIO AGUINALDO, *General-in-Chief*."

[NOTE. It appears from the above that Aguinaldo was in Malolos, when the outbreak occurred.]

SECOND PROCLAMATION.*

"By my proclamation of yesterday I have published the outbreak of hostilities between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occupation in Manila, unjustly and unexpectedly provoked by the latter.

"In my manifest of January 8 last I published the grievances suffered by the Philippine forces at the hands of the army of occupation. The constant outrages and taunts,

* Senate Document 208, page 105.

which have caused the misery of the people of Manila, and, finally, the useless conferences and the contempt shown the Philippine Government prove the premeditated transgression of justice and liberty.

"I know that war has always produced great losses: I know that the Philippine people have not yet recovered from past losses and are not in the condition to endure others. But I also know by experience how bitter is slavery, and by experience I know that we should sacrifice all on the altar of our honor and of the national integrity so unjustly attacked.

"I have tried to avoid, as far as it has been possible for me to do so, armed conflict, in my endeavors to assure our independence by pacific means and to avoid more costly sacrifices. But all my efforts have been useless against the measureless pride of the American Government and of its representatives in these islands, who have treated me as a rebel because I defend the sacred interests of my country and do not make myself an instrument of their dastardly intentions.

"Past campaigns will have convinced you that the people are strong when they wish to be. Without arms we have driven from our beloved country our ancient masters, and without arms we can repulse the foreign invasion as long as we wish to do so. Providence always has means in reserve and prompt help for the weak in order that they may not be annihilated by the strong; that justice may be done and humanity progress.

"Be not discouraged. Our independence has been watered by the generous blood of our martyrs. Blood which may be shed in the future will strengthen it. Nature has never despised generous sacrifices.

"But remember that in order that our efforts may not be wasted, that our vows may be listened to, that our ends may be gained, it is indispensable that we adjust our actions to the rules of law and of right, learning to triumph over our enemies and to conquer our own evil passions.

"EMILIO AGUINALDO,

"President of the Philippine Republic.

'MALOLOS, February 5, 1899."

II. LATER ACCOUNTS OF THE OUTBREAK.

1. Secretary Root's Account.*

"The principal military operations of the year have been in the Philippine Islands. At the date of the last annual report the Eighth Army Corps, under the command of Brig. Gen. E. S. Otis, held possession of the city of Manila under the provisions of the protocol of August 12, 1898, which required the United States to occupy and hold that city pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace, and which imposed upon the troops in possession at once the obligation to protect life and property within the city and refrain from infringing upon the Spanish territory outside of the city limits. In the performance of this duty many annoyances were experienced from the army of the Tagalogs, who were in insurrection against the Government of Spain, and who had been collected about the city after its capture by the American forces had become inevitable, under the promise of their leaders that they should share in the plunder of the inhabitants.

"General Otis was ordered to avoid any conflict with them, and, strictly complying with these orders, he made every effort to secure a peaceable understanding. The peaceable attitude of the American forces was unfortunately misconstrued as indicating weakness and fear of a conflict. On the night of the 4th of February, 1899, our forces were attacked by the Tagalogs, who attempted to capture the city. They were promptly repulsed in a series of active engagements which extended through the night of the 4th and the 5th, 6th and 10th days of February. Our lines were extended and established at a considerable distance from the city in every direction. On the 22d of February a concerted rising

* Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, page 7.

of the Tagalogs in the city of Manila, of whom there were about 200,000, was attempted, under instructions to massacre all the Americans and Europeans in the city. This attempt was promptly suppressed and the city was placed under strict control."

[NOTE: Secretary Root, in his speech at Canton, Ohio, October 24, 1900, summarized the outbreak as follows: *]

"On the 4th of February, two days before the Senate approved the treaty, an army of Tagalogs, a tribe inhabiting the central part of Luzon, under the leadership of Aguinaldo, a Chinese half-breed, attacked, in vastly superior numbers, our little army in the possession of Manila, and, after a desperate and bloody fight, was repulsed in every direction. The treaty was confirmed by the Senate with the full knowledge of that attack."

2. Account of the Schurman Commission.†

"Danger signals now multiplied. Aguinaldo endeavored to get the war making power transferred from congress to himself. He also urged a heavy bond issue to secure one million dollars for the purchase of arms and ammunition. It is now known that elaborate plans had been perfected for a simultaneous attack by the forces within and without Manila. The militia within the city numbered approximately ten thousand: they were armed for the most part with bolos. General Pio del Pilar slept in the city every night. No definite date had been set for the attack, but a signal by means of rockets had been agreed upon, and it was universally understood that it would come upon the occurrence of the first act on the part of the American forces which would afford a pretext: and in

* Speech of the Hon. Elihu Root at Canton, Ohio, Oct. 24, 1900, page 9.

† Report of the Philippine Commission, Vol. I., page 174.

the lack of such act, in the near future at all events. Persistent attempts were made to provoke our soldiers to fire. The insurgents were insolent to our guards and made persistent and continuous efforts to push them back, and advance the insurgent lines farther into the city of Manila. It was a long and trying period of insult and abuse heaped upon our soldiers, with constant submission as the only means of avoiding an open rupture. The Filipinos had concluded that our soldiers were cowards and boasted openly that they were afraid of them. Rumors were always prevalent that our army would be attacked at once. With great tact and patience the commanding general had held his forces in check, and he now made a final effort to preserve the peace by appointing a commission to meet a similar body appointed by Aguinaldo and to 'confer with regard to the situation of affairs and to arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent, purposes, aims, and desires of the Filipino people and of the people of the United States.' Six sessions were held, the last occurring on January 29, six days before the outbreak of hostilities. No substantial results were obtained, the Filipino commissioners being either unable or unwilling to give any definite statements of the 'intent, purpose and aims of their people.' At the close of the last session they were given full assurances that no hostile act would be inaugurated by the United States troops.

"The critical moment had now arrived. Aguinaldo secretly ordered the Filipinos who were friendly to him to seek refuge outside of the city. The Nebraska regiment at that time was in camp on the east line at Santa Mesa, and was guarding its front. For days before the memorable 4th of February, 1899, the outposts in front of the regiment had been openly menaced and assaulted by insurgent soldiers: they were attempting to push our outposts back and advance their line. They made light of our sentinels and persistently ignored their orders.

"On the evening of the 4th of February, an insurgent officer came to the front with a detail of men, and attempted to pass the guard on the San Juan Bridge, our guard being

stationed at the west end of the bridge. The Nebraska sentinel drove them back without firing, but a few minutes before nine o'clock that evening a large body of insurgent troops made an advance on the South Dakota outposts, which fell back rather than fire. About the same time the insurgents came in force to the east end of the San Juan bridge, in front of the Nebraska regiment. For several nights prior thereto, a lieutenant in the insurgent army had been coming regularly to our outpost No. 2, of the Nebraska Regiment, and attempting to force the outpost back and insisting on posting his guard within the Nebraska lines: and at this time and in the darkness he again appeared with a detail of about six men and approached Private Grayson, of Company D, First Nebraska Volunteers, the sentinel on duty at Outpost No. 2. He after halting them three times without effect, fired, killing the lieutenant, whose men returned the fire, and then retreated. Immediately rockets were sent up by the Filipinos, and they commenced firing all along the line.

"The story of the actual fighting has often been told by military men who were engaged in it, and we do not deem it necessary to give a description of it here. It is known of all men that immediately after the first shot the insurgents opened fire all along their line, and continued to fire until about midnight; and about four o'clock on the morning of February 5th the insurgents again opened fire all around the city and kept it up until the Americans charged them and drove them with great slaughter out of their trenches.

"After the landing of our troops, Aguinaldo made up his mind that it would be necessary to fight the Americans, and after the making of the treaty of peace at Paris, this determination was strengthened. He did not openly declare that he intended to fight the Americans, but he excited everybody, and especially the military men, by claiming independence, and it is doubtful whether he had the power to check or control the army at the time the hostilities broke out. Deplorable as war is, the one in which we are now engaged was unavoidable by us. We were attacked by a bold, adven-

turous and enthusiastic army. No alternative was left us except ignominious retreat. It is not to be conceived of that any American would have sanctioned the surrender of Manila to the insurgents. Our obligations to other nations, and to the friendly Filipinos, and to ourselves and our flag, demanded that force should be met with force. Whatever the future of the Philippines may be, there is no course open to us now except the prosecution of the war until the insurgents are reduced to submission. The commission is of the opinion that there has been no time since the destruction of the Spanish squadron by Admiral Dewey when it was possible to withdraw our forces from the islands either with honor to ourselves or with safety to the inhabitants."

3. Account of John Foreman, F. R. G. S.*

"In December, 1898, the Treaty of Peace between America and Spain was signed in Paris, and Article 9 says: 'The United States Congress will decide, in due course, all that concerns the civil rights and political status of the natives who inhabit the ceded territories.' The question of the treaty ratification was hotly debated in Washington. A week before the vote was taken it seemed doubtful whether the necessary two-thirds majority would uphold the Treaty. It is a noticeable coincidence that just when the Republican party was straining every nerve to secure the two or three wavering votes, the first shots were exchanged between a native and an American outpost in the suburbs of Manila. Each side insists that the other opened hostilities, and, if the Filipinos were the aggressors, it is very remarkable that the American troops should have been so well prepared for an unforeseen event as to be able to immediately and simultaneously attack, in full force, all the native outposts for miles around the capital. This occurred on the 4th of February,

* *The National Review*, September, 1900, page 54.

1899, and the Americans continued the slaughter the next day, particularly in the parish of Paco, where they inflicted on the natives a loss of 400 killed. The news being at once cabled to Washington had the desired effect of drawing the doubtful votes to the Government side, and the treaty was ratified by the two-thirds majority on the 10th of the same month.

"Thenceforth the Filipinos were dubbed rebels, and the American policy of conquest was inaugurated under the new name of 'Benevolent assimilation.'"

4. Account of Frederic H. Sawyer.*

"I do not know which party was the aggressor on February 4th, 1899, each swears that it was the other. The *cui bono* test cuts both ways, for whilst it appears that the attack on Manila secured two doubtful votes in the Senate for the ratification of the Treaty whereby the Philippines were bought from Spain, on the other hand, Aguinaldo may have felt it necessary to prove to America that the Philippines would fight rather than bow their necks to the Yankee yoke. So that both parties may have had an interest in beginning hostilities."

* The Inhabitants of the Philippines, page 113. The author was for fourteen years a resident of the Philippines.

III. STATEMENTS OF OUR COMMANDING OFFICERS.

1. Account of General Otis.

"The battle of Manila, which commenced at half past 8 o'clock on the evening of February 4, continued until 5 the next evening. Its details were fully reported on April 6 last, and it is not necessary to present them anew. I insert a short extract from that report to show the determination of the insurgents to provoke conflict :

"During the entire month of January they labored incessantly to strongly intrench their lines and place their artillery in position,† and boasted freely of their intentions to soon drive the American forces out of Manila. On the night of February 2d, they sent in a strong detachment to draw the fire of our outpost, which took up a position immediately in front of and within a few yards of the same. The outpost was strengthened by a few of our men who silently bore their taunts and abuse the entire night. This was reported to me by General MacArthur, whom I directed to communicate with the officer in command of the insurgent troops concerned. His prepared letter was shown to me and approved, and the reply received (both papers found in General MacArthur's accompanying report)‡ was all that could be desired. However, the agreement was ignored by the insurgents and on the evening of February 4th, another demonstration was made on one of our small outposts which occupied a retired position at least 150 yards within the line which had been mutually agreed upon — an insurgent approaching the picket and refusing to halt or answer when

* Otis report for 1899, page 96.

† The remainder of this sentence is filled in from the detailed account of April 6, Report of Secretary of War for 1899, Part 2, page 365.

‡ See page 29 below.

challenged. The result was that our picket discharged his piece, when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed.*

"The insurgent army had thus succeeded in drawing the fire of a small outpost, which they had evidently labored with all their ingenuity to accomplish in order to justify in some way their premeditated attack. It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wished to open hostilities at this time, as they were not completely prepared to assume the initiative. They desired two or three days more to perfect their arrangements, but the zeal of their army brought on the crisis which anticipated their action. They could not have delayed long, however, for it was their object to force an issue before American troops then *en route* could arrive at Manila.

"The engagement was one strictly defensive on the part of the insurgents and of vigorous attack by our forces, although during the night it was confined to an exchange of fire between the opposing lines on the north of the Pasig River to the Lico Road, a distance of about two miles, with an occasional shot on the south in the vicinity of Paco, and a few straggling shots on the extreme left in the direction of Caloocan. Admiral Dewey had placed two vessels a short distance off shore to the north and one to the south of our flanks, where they rested on Manila Bay, and shortly after daybreak on the morning of the 5th I telegraphed him: 'Heavy firing all along our north front at midnight and at 4 A. M. Casual firing at Paco. Several casualties in Tondo district. Charleston and Callao could give efficient aid in that vicinity,' and at 6.50 A. M. I wired him that 'Firing continues: few casualties: a sharp raking fire of one half hour just to north of blockhouse on Vitas Pass would reach insurgents' line and demoralize them.' This was effected, and the Monadnock on the south was also doing good service. At midnight General Anderson, who commanded all

* The following paragraph is supplied from the detailed account of April 6.

troops south of the Pasig, consisting of King's and Oven-shine's brigades, was directed to hold them in readiness to receive a morning attack, but not to attack until further instructed. Our immediate interests lay to the northeast and compromised the pumping-station and *deposito* of waterworks, which it was necessary to secure although we had provided for their loss, in so far as the army was concerned, by erecting a number of distilling plants along the river banks, by which good water could be obtained. Stotsenburg had attacked early in the morning, drove the enemy from the blockhouses in his front, and reported that he could capture the powder magazine and waterworks (*deposito* meaning, though pumping station understood at the time) if desired. MacArthur had been pressing back the enemy in his entire front, inflicting heavy loss."

[NOTE: The words, "The engagement was one strictly defensive on the part of the insurgents and of vigorous attack by our forces," have been widely quoted as evidence that the United States inaugurated hostilities. In the opinion of the editors, the context does not bear out such an assertion.]

2. General MacArthur's Account.*

[NOTE: At the time of the outbreak of hostilities, General MacArthur was in command of the Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, which division included the First Nebraska Regiment, stationed at Santa Mesa, opposite Block-House 7, where the first firing occurred. Whether Santa Mesa was subject by the terms of the protocol† to American jurisdiction is a question that has been much debated. It

* Report of Major-General MacArthur, U. S. V., in Report of Major-General Commanding the Army. Part II., page 423.

† See Protocol of Agreement between United States and Spain, Article III., "The United States will occupy city, bay and harbor of Manila," Senate Document 62, 55th Congress, 3d Session, page 283.

had not been claimed by General Merritt in his letter of August 20,* in which he had given a list of what he considered to be the suburbs of Manila, but had been included among the positions demanded by General Otis on October 14. After contesting General Otis's claim through the mediation of a commission, Aguinaldo finally wrote General Otis on October 22, calling attention to the fact that Pandacan, of which Santa Mesa was a part, had not been claimed by General Merritt. In this letter Aguinaldo, while still asserting his right to Pandacan, conceded the districts of Uli Uli, Nactahan and Santa Mesa to General Otis "in order to prevent the continual encounters" between the two forces, "which caused disagreeable incidents." § Santa Mesa, which was at that time occupied by our troops, does not seem to have come again under dispute, but to have been admittedly under our jurisdiction up to the time of the outbreak.]

"The pertinacity of the insurgents in passing armed parties over the line of delimitation into American territory at a point nearly opposite the pipe-line outpost of the Nebraska Regiment induced a correspondence which, in the light of subsequent events, is interesting, as indicating with considerable precision, a premeditated purpose on the part of somebody in the insurgent army to force a collision at that point. The original note from these headquarters, which was prepared after conference with the department commander, was carried by Major Strong, who entered the insurgent lines and placed the paper in the hands of Colonel San Miguel. The answer of Colonel San Miguel was communicated in an autograph note, which was written in the presence of Major Strong, who also saw Colonel San Miguel write an order to his officer at the outpost in question, directing him to withdraw from the American side of the line. This order Major

* See Senate Document 208, 56th Congress, 1st Session, page 20, reprinted in Pamphlet V. of this series, page 29.

§ See Otis Report for 1899, page 19. For full correspondence, see Pamphlet V., pages 47-54.

Strong saw delivered to the officer on the outpost. The correspondence referred to is as follows, the original of Colonel San Miguel's note, which was written in the Spanish language, being inclosed herewith.

"HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,

"Manila, P. I., February 2, 1899.

"COMMANDING GENERAL,

"Philippine Troops in Third Zone.

"SIR: The line between your command and my command has been long established, and is well understood by yourself and myself. It is quite necessary, under present conditions, that this line should not be passed by armed men of either command.

"An armed party from your command now occupies the village in front of Blockhouse No. 7, at a point considerably more than a hundred yards on my side of the line, and is very active in exhibiting hostile intentions. This party must be withdrawn to your side of the line at once.

"From this date if the line is crossed by your men with arms in their hands, they must be regarded as subject to such action as I may deem necessary.

"Very respectfully,

"ARTHUR MACARTHUR,

"Major-General U. S. V., Commanding.

SAN JUAN DEL MONTE, *February 2, 1899.*

"MAJOR-GENERAL MACARTHUR.

"*My Very Dear Sir:* In reply to yours dated this day, in which you inform me that my soldiers have been passing the line of demarcation fixed by agreement, I desire to say that this is foreign to my wishes, and I shall give immediate orders in the premises that they retire.

"Truly yours,

"L. F. SAN MIGUEL,

"Colonel and First Chief.

"At about half past 8 P. M. February 4th, an insurgent patrol, consisting of four armed soldiers, entered our territory at Blockhouse No. 7, and advanced to the little village of Santol, which was occupied from the pipe-line outpost of the Nebraska Regiment. This, it will be observed, was precisely the point referred to in the correspondence above quoted. The American sentinel challenged twice, and then, as the insurgent patrol continued to advance, he fired, whereupon the patrol retired to Blockhouse 7, from whence fire was immediately opened by the entire insurgent outpost at that point.

"At 9 P. M. Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., reported considerable firing at his outposts, which extended gradually along the entire front of the division. At 10 P. M. it was evident that hostilities had been commenced in earnest by the insurgents, and accordingly an order was issued from these headquarters to put everything on the firing line, according to a programme which had been pre-arranged for such an emergency."

3. Further Evidence Forwarded by General Otis.*

"OFFICE OF UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNOR
IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,

"Manila, P. I., March 8, 1900.

"SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith an autograph letter of Aguinaldo dated January 7, 1899, which is one of a number written by him to his friends in Manila, warning them to leave the city for their safety. Upon receipt of these warnings a number of families departed for Malolos and some for Hongkong.

"The letter is forwarded to meet still further the absurd

*Senate Document 208, Part 4, Page 1.

charge that the American authorities in Manila inaugurated the war.

Very respectfully,

"E. S. OTIS,

"*Major-General United States Volunteers,*

"*United States Military Governor*

"*of the Philippine Islands.*

"The ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,

"WASHINGTON.

"[Presidency. Personal.]

"REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,

"*Malolos, January 7, 1899.*

"MY DEAR DON BENITO: I write this to ask you to send to this our Government the photograph you have in your house, and I will pay you for whatever price you may ask. Also please buy me everything which may be necessary to provide the said photograph.

"I beg you to leave Manila with your family and to come here to Malolos, but not because I wish to frighten you — I merely wish to warn you for your satisfaction, although it is not yet the day or the week.

"Your affectionate friend, who kisses your hands,

"EMILIO AGUINALDO.

"Sr. D. BENITO LEGARDA."

4. Later Report of General Otis.*

"But before proceeding with the rehearsal, I desire to correct an erroneous impression which appears to prevail to a moderate extent (whether drawn from my former report or an incorrect knowledge of the then existing conditions I

* Otis Report, September 1, 1899, to May 5, 1900, given in Report of the War Department for 1900, Vol. I., Part 4, page 199.

know not) that war with the insurgents was initiated by the United States Government, or that the attitude or conduct of its troops in Manila was the cause of hostilities, unless possibly it may be held that their failure to resent insult or punish hostile demonstration constantly recurring in their midst encouraged the already openly avowed enemy in the belief that it could easily slaughter them within the city which it had invested, and thereby incited him to action. War with the insurgents in the Philippines was forced upon us and was unavoidable. No nation but the United States would have permitted an unfriendly force of large numerical strength to throw up intrenchments and erect fortifications in the immediate proximity of its troops, as did the insurgents during several weeks preceding their attack on Manila, without considering it an act of war and adopting measures to arrest it. By all law and approved precedent the United States would have been fully justified in arresting these insurgent demonstrations by demand, to be followed with the application of force if demand was insufficient; and had that course been adopted no wrong could have been imputed to our Government. The subject, however, is no longer matter for argument, as the captured insurgent records have set the question at rest forever. They show that Aguinaldo, under the advice of the Hongkong junta, proceeded from that city to Manila Harbor with the intention of securing as much aid from the United States as possible, and then, when in his opinion he might find himself sufficiently strong, of driving out the Americans with the sword. His course throughout was consistent with this well-settled intention. His declaration of independence of June, 1898; his capture during the succeeding months of the slightly garrisoned Spanish posts throughout the islands, by which he obtained large quantities of arms and ammunition; the elimination from his so-called government of his ablest advisers, who advocated United States supremacy; his declared dictatorship; the concentration of his troops around Manila; the public demonstrations and rejoicings at his capital of Malolos on the anticipated

victory of his army shortly before hostilities commenced — all following each other in well-timed succession — are sufficient in themselves to prove a predetermined, definite plan of action to place the country under Tagalo rule.

“ But independent of the proof attendant upon this concerted plan, absolutely convincing evidence of intention to attack the United States troops is found in Aguinaldo’s autographic instructions of January 9, 1899 (nearly four weeks before active hostilities were inaugurated), wherein he displays great simplicity in knowledge of military matters, but not that savage ferocity which characterized his instructions issued after the signal defeat of his troops on February 5, and which were set out on page 182 of my report of August 31 last. His duplicity at this time was marvelous, for he was professing friendship toward the United States, manifesting a great desire to restrain his people from committing hostile acts, and, upon the day his instructions bear date, he appointed a commission to confer with one to be appointed by myself ‘for the sake of peace’, as he expressed it. The instructions are in Tagalo, and the following is a translation :

“MALOLOS, 9th of January, 1899.

“Instructions to the Brave Soldiers of Sandatahan of Manila.

“ARTICLE I. All Filipinos should observe our fellow countrymen in order to see whether they are American sympathizers. They shall take care to work with them in order to inspire them with confidence of the strength of the holy cause of their country.

“Whenever they are assured of the loyalty of the convert they shall instruct them to continue in the character of an American sympathizer in order that they may receive good pay, but without prejudicing the cause of our country. In this way they can serve themselves and at the same time serve the public by communicating to the committee of chiefs and officials of our army whatever news of importance they may have.

"ARTICLE 2. All of the chiefs and the Filipino brothers should be ready and courageous for the combat, and should take advantage of the opportunity to study well the situation of the American outposts and headquarters. Observing especially secret places where they can approach and surprise the enemy.

"ARTICLE 3. The chief of those who go to attack the barracks should send in first four men with a good present for the American commander. Immediately after will follow four others, who will make a pretence of looking for the same officer for some reason, and a larger group shall be concealed in the corners or houses in order to aid the other groups at the first signal. This wherever it is possible at the moment of attack.

"ARTICLE 4. They should not, prior to the attack, look at the Americans in a threatening manner. To the contrary, the attack on the barracks by the Sandatahan should be a complete surprise and with decision and courage. One should go alone in advance in order to kill the sentinel. In order to deceive the sentinel, the one should dress as a woman and must take great care that the sentinel is not able to discharge his piece, thus calling the attention of those in the barracks. This will enable his companions who are approaching to assist in the general attack.

"ARTICLE 5. At the moment of the attack the Sandatahan should not attempt to secure rifles from their dead enemies, but shall pursue, slashing right and left with bolos until the Americans surrender, and after there remains no enemy who can injure them they may take the rifles in one hand and the ammunition in the other.

"ARTICLE 6. The officers shall take care that on the top of the houses along the streets where the American forces shall pass there will be placed four to six men, who shall be prepared with stones, timbers, red-hot iron, heavy furniture, as well as boiling water, oil, and molasses, rags soaked in coal oil, ready to be lighted and thrown down, and any other hard and heavy objects that they can throw on the passing

Americpan troos. At the same time, in the lower parts of the houses will be concealed the Sandatahan, who will attack immediately. Great care should be taken not to throw glass in the streets, as the greater part of our soldiers go bare-footed. On these houses there will, if possible, be arranged, in addition to the objects to be thrown down, a number of the Sandatahan, in order to cover a retreat or to follow up a rout of the enemy's column, so that we may be sure of the destruction of all of the opposing forces.

"ARTICLE 7. All Filipinos, real defenders of their country, should live on the alert to assist simultaneously the inside attack at the very moment that they note the first movement in whatever barrio or suburb, having assurance that all the troops that surround Manila will proceed without delay to force the enemy's line and unite themselves with their brothers in the city. With such a general movement, so firm and decided against the Americans, the combat is sure to be a short one; and I charge and order that the persons and goods of all foreigners shall be respected and that the American prisoners shall be treated well.

"ARTICLE 8. All of our chiefs in the suburbs should prepare groups of the Sandatahan, who will attack with ferocity and decision the Americans within their lines, attempting to surround each group of Americans or to break through their lines. This must be done if the nature of the ground occupied by the Americans will permit; and if the Sandatahan have the proper amount of courage and resolution, and the more courage and resolution they show in the moment of the attack, the surer will be the result and the fewer will be their own losses.

"ARTICLE 9. In addition to the instructions given in paragraph 6, there shall be in the houses vessels filled with boiling water, tallow, molasses, and other liquids which shall be thrown as bombs on the Americans who pass in front of their houses, or they can make use of syringes or tubes of bamboo. In these houses shall be the Sandatahan, who shall hurl the liquids that shall be passed to them by the women and children.

"ARTICLE 10. In place of bolos or daggers, if they do not possess the same, the Sandatahan can provide themselves with lances and arrows with long and sharp heads, and these should be shot with great force in order that they may penetrate well into the bodies of the enemy. And these should be so made that in withdrawal from the body the head will remain in the flesh.

"ARTICLE 11. It can be taken for granted that, if the above instructions are observed, the enemy will not be able to use firearms because of the confusion in his ranks, as they would shoot one another. For this reason I have always thought the rifle useless in this kind of combat, for experience has taught me, my dear brothers, that when the Sandatahan make their attack with courage and decision, taking advantage of the confusion in the ranks of the enemy, the victory is sure, and in that case the triumph is ours.

"ARTICLE 12. At last, if, as I expect, the result shall favor us in the taking of Manila and the conquering of the enemy, the chiefs are charged with seeing that the officers and soldiers respect the consulates, the banks, and commercial houses, taking care that they be not seduced by the hope of plunder. As if God sees this, He will reward us, and the foreign nations will note the order and justice of our conduct. I charge that in the moment of combat, the officers, soldiers, and whatever patriots take part in the struggle, will not forget our noble, sacred, and holy ideals, Liberty and Independence. Neither will you forget your sacred oath and immaculate banner: nor will you forget the promises made by me to the civilized nations, whom I have assured that we Filipinos are not savages, nor thieves, nor assassins, nor are we cruel: but on the contrary that we are men of culture and patriotism, honorable and very humane.

"Above all I expect that you will respect the persons and goods of private persons of all nationalities, including the Chinese: that you will treat well the prisoners, and grant life to those of the enemy who surrender. And that you be on the lookout for those traitors and enemies, who by robbery, will seek to mar our victory.

"EMILIO AGUINALDO."

IV. DID AGUINALDO APPLY FOR CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES?

[NOTE: It is often stated and as often denied that on the day after the outbreak, Aguinaldo applied for a cessation of hostilities and was told that "fighting having once begun must go on to the grim end." Both assertions and denials are based upon the following evidence.]

1. First Cable from General Otis.*

"Manila (Received February 8, 1899—1.58 a. m.)

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL, WASHINGTON:

"Situation rapidly improving. Reconnoissance yesterday to south several miles, to east to Laguna de Bay, to northeast 8 miles driving straggling insurgent troops in various directions, encountering no decided opposition. Army disintegrated and natives returning to village displaying white flag. Near Caloocan, 6 miles north, enemy made stand behind intrenchments; charged by Kansas troops, led by Colonel Funston; close encounter, resulting in rout of enemy with very heavy loss. Loss to Kansas, Lieutenant Alford killed, 6 men wounded. Night of 4th Aguinaldo issued flying proclamation charging Americans with initiative and declared war. Sunday issued another, calling all to resist foreign invasion. His influence throughout this section destroyed. Now applies for cessation of hostilities and conference. Have declined to answer. Insurgent expectation of rising in city on night of 4th unrealized. Provost-marshal-general, with admirable disposition of troops, defeated every attempt. City quiet. Business resumed. Natives respectful and cheerful. The fighting qualities of American troops a revelation to all inhabitants. "OTIS."

* Senate Document 387, 56th Cong. 1st Sess., page 3.

2. Statement of General C. McC. Reeve, April, 1899.*

"I can tell you one piece of news that is not generally known in the United States. On Sunday, February 5th, the day after the fighting began, General Torres, of the insurgents, came through our lines under a flag of truce, and had a personal interview with General Otis, in which, speaking for Aguinaldo, he declared that the fighting had been begun accidentally and was not authorized by Aguinaldo; that Aguinaldo wished to have it stopped, and that to bring about a conclusion of hostilities he proposed the establishment of a neutral zone between the two armies of any width that would be agreeable to General Otis, so that during the peace negotiations there might be no further danger of conflicts between the two armies. To these representations of General Torres General Otis sternly replied that the fighting having once begun must go on to the grim end. And it has been going on ever since."

[NOTE: General Reeve's statement led to the following resolution,† which was introduced in the Senate, January 3, 1900, and agreed to April 28, of that year:]

"Resolved, That the President be and he is hereby, requested, if not incompatible with the public interest, to inform the Senate whether General Torres, one of the officers of the Philippine army, came to General Otis with a flag of truce on February 5, 1899, the day after the fighting commenced between our forces and those of the Filipinos, and stated to General Otis that General Aguinaldo declared that fighting had been begun accidentally and was not authorized by him, and that Aguinaldo wished to have it stopped, and that to bring about a conclusion of hostilities he proposed the establishment of a neutral zone between the two armies of a width that would be agreeable to General Otis, so that during the peace negotiations there might be no further

* Interview in Minneapolis, April, 1899.

† Senate Document 387, page 1.

danger of conflict between the two armies, and whether General Otis replied that fighting having once begun must go on to the grim end. Was General Otis directed by the Secretary of War to make such an answer? Did General Otis telegraph the Secretary of War on February 9, 1899, as follows: 'Aguinaldo now applies for a cessation of hostilities and conference. Have declined to answer'? And did General Otis afterwards reply, was he directed by the Secretary of War to reply, and what answer, if any, did he or the Secretary of War make to the application to cease fighting?"

[NOTE: In accordance with this resolution, Adjutant-General Corbin cabled to General Otis as follows: *]

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
" *Washington, April 30, 1900.*

"OTIS, *Manila*:

"Cable whether General Torres came to you under flag of truce February 5, 1899, and stated Aguinaldo declared fighting had begun accidentally and not authorized by him; that Aguinaldo wished it stopped, and to end hostilities proposed establishment of neutral zone between the two armies, of width agreeable to you, so during peace negotiations there might be no further danger conflict: whether you replied, fighting having begun must go on to grim end.

"CORBIN."

[NOTE: The reply cablegram from General Otis was transmitted to Congress by the President of the United States with the following words: †]

"General Otis was not directed by the Secretary of War to make such an answer as is set forth in the resolution, nor were any answers to communications upon the subject of the cessation of hostilities prescribed by the Secretary of War to General Otis, but he was left to exercise, in respect thereof, his own judgment, based upon his superior knowledge of the conditions surrounding the troops under his command.

* Senate Document 387, page 2.

† Ibid.

"I also submit a copy of a cable dispatch from General Otis sent from Manila, February 8, 1899, received in Washington February 9, 1899, being the same dispatch to which he refers in his reply of May 1, 1900, as misleading. So far as I am informed General Otis did not afterwards reply, except as set forth in his said dispatch of May 1, 1900. He was not directed by the Secretary of War to reply, and no answer was made by him or the Secretary of War to an application to cease fighting. There appears to have been no such application."

3. General Otis's Reply Cablegram.*

MANILA, May 1, 1900.

"AGWAR, *Washington* :

"Judge Torres, citizen, resident of Manila, who had served as member insurgent commission, reported evening February 5, asking if something could not be done to stop the fighting, as establishment of neutral zone. I replied Aguinaldo had commenced the fighting and must apply for cessation ; I had nothing to request from the insurgent government. He asked permission to send Colonel Arguellez to Malolos, and Arguellez was passed through the lines near Caloocan next morning. He went direct to Malolos, told General Aguinaldo and Mabini that General Otis would permit suspension of hostilities upon their request. They replied declaration of war had been made, a copy of which they furnished him. They said they had no objection to suspension of hostilities ; but beyond this general remark made no response, but directed him to return with that message. Arguellez reported that he conveyed my statement ; that they had commenced the war, and it must go on, since they had chosen that course of action, but did not attempt to induce them to make any proposition, as he feared accusation of

* Senate Document 387, page 2.

cowardice. The insurgent chief authorities made no proposition and did not intend to make any, nor did they attempt to do so until driven out of Malolos. My hasty dispatch of about that date misleading. Took in writing statement of Arguellez several days ago in order to fully understand temper of insurgents at early period of war.

“OTIS.”

4. Later Statement by General Otis.*

“Another erroneous impression which, if it has not widely prevailed, results from the failure of a few who have endeavored to create it, is that on the evening following the severe fighting on February 5, 1899, the insurgent authorities sought a conference with a view of terminating hostilities. These false impressions may have arisen in part from a hastily prepared telegram sent from Manila, on that date, stating in substance that the insurgents had asked for a temporary suspension of hostilities, but had received the reply that having commenced war, it must continue. No proposition of any kind came from the insurgent authorities. The facts are as follows:

“Judge Torres, the present attorney-general of the islands, who had recently arrived from Cebu, where he had filled a judicial position under the Spanish Government, immediately upon his arrival in Manila exerted himself for the maintenance of peace, and offered his services to Aguinaldo to assist in bringing about friendly conditions. On January 9, Aguinaldo had appointed him senior member of what was termed his peace commission. He was at his home in Manila February 5, and visited me on the evening of that day, praying that I would propose to the insurgent authorities the establishment of a neutral zone that terms of peace might be considered.

“He was informed that as war was the act of the insur-

* Report of May 14, 1900, given in Report of Secretary of War for 1900, Vol. I, Part 4, page 202.

gents, we could not initiate proceedings, but that it must continue until they (the insurgents) were ready to submit propositions. He then asked that a fellow member of his insurgent commission, Colonel Arguelles, who was in the city, might be permitted to pass through the lines in order to visit Malolos and confer with Aguinaldo and his principal advisers. This was granted, and Arguelles was taken by Colonel Kilbourne, of the Pay Department, to that portion of General MacArthur's line of battle opposite Caloocan. It being quite late in the evening when he arrived there, he concluded to return to the city and recommence the journey early the following morning, which he did. He was passed through the lines under a flag of truce, was absent two or three days, when he returned, and was properly received by a party, which was viciously fired on by the insurgents as soon as their flag of truce had withdrawn a short distance. The firing caused our party to retreat quickly, Arguelles leading it and anathematizing his countrymen. He reported that his mission had been unsuccessful, and that his advice was not heeded.

"A few weeks ago he related his experience to me quite fully. He said that upon arriving at Malolos he saw General Aguinaldo and Senor Mabini and made known to them that General Otis would permit a suspension of hostilities upon the request of the former, and received reply that a declaration of war had been made, copies of which were furnished him. Both Aguinaldo and Mabini made the statement that they had no objections to the suspension of hostilities, but beyond this general remark offered nothing, and declined to discuss details. Arguelles said that he was directed to return to Manila and report simply that the insurgent authorities would not object to a suspension of hostilities if desired. Asked what further took place at the conference, he answered 'Nothing,' and that he merely told Aguinaldo and Mabini what I had said, which was to the effect that they had commenced the war and it must continue, since they had chosen that course of action, but that I would listen to propositions

if they wished to submit them. Asked if he endeavored to induce General Aguinaldo to submit a proposition, he replied in the negative, saying that he had feared to do so as he might, in the then excited condition of the Filipino people, be charged with cowardice; that prior to the outbreak of hostilities he had stated to the insurgent government his belief that the Filipinos could not successfully resist the United States, and had thereby incurred the enmity of General Luna which relentlessly followed him. The insurgents did not desire peace at this time. They sent word to their friends in Manila, soon after their defeat of February 5, that they were not in the least discouraged; that the battle had united their people in sentiment, and that they were strong in men and war material. Not until they were driven beyond Calumpit and Baliuag did they make any attempt to secure a conference with the United States authorities, and then only for the purpose of gaining sufficient time to reassemble their scattered forces."

V. ORDER OF FEBRUARY FIFTEENTH.*

[NOTE:] On the 21st of February, 1899, General Otis forwarded to Washington the following alleged insurgent order for a general massacre of the foreigners in Manila:]

"Manila, February 21, 1899.

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington:

"Following issued by an important officer of insurgent government at Malolos, February 15, 1899, for execution during that evening and night in this city.

"OTIS.

"First. You will so dispose that 8 o'clock at night the individuals of the territorial militia, at your order, will be found united in all of the streets of San Pedro, armed with their bolos and revolvers or guns and ammunition if convenient.

"Second. Philippine families only will be respected: they should not be molested, but all other individuals, of what race they may be, will be exterminated without apprisement (or) compassion, after the extermination of the army of occupation.†

"Third. The defender of the Philippines in your command will attack the guard at Bilibid and liberate the prisoners and 'presidarios,' and accomplished this they will be armed, saying to them: 'Brothers, we must avenge ourselves on the Americans' and exterminate them, that we may have our revenge for the infamy and treachery which they have committed upon us: have no compassion upon them: attack with vigor: all Filipinos en masse will second you.' 'Long live Filipinos indipendienta.

* Senate Document 208, page 257.

† It should be noted that these bloodthirsty instructions are at variance with the directions given in Articles 7 and 12 of Aguinaldo's order of January 9, reprinted on pages 35 and 36 above.

"*Fifth.* The order which will be followed in the attack will be as follows: 'The sharpshooters of Tondo and Santa Ana will be the attack from without and these shots will be the signal for the militia of Trozo, Binondo, Quiapo and Sampaloc to go out into the streets and do their duty. Those of Pako Ermita, and Malate, Santa Cruz, and San Miguel will not start out until 12 o'clock unless they see that their companions need assistance.

"*Sixth.* The militia of Tondo will start out at 3 o'clock in the morning; if all do their duty our revenge will be complete. Brothers, Europe contemplates us. We know how to die as men shedding our blood in defence of the liberty of our country. Death to the tyrants! War without quarter to the false Americans who have deceived us! Either independence or death!"

[NOTE: The telegrams* printed below give further information, with regard to the order.]

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

"*Washington, January 22, 1900.*

"OTIS, *Manila*:

"Secretary of War desires to know name important officer insurgents mentioned in your telegram February 21.

"CORBIN.

"MANILA.

"(*Received January 23, 1900, 6.20 A. M.*)

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

"Refer to our telegram of 21st February, Teodoro Sandico; whereabouts unknown; see page 182, annual report.

"OTIS.

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

"*Washington, D. C., January 23, 1900.*

"OTIS, *Manila*:

"Secretary of War desires to know position held in so-called government by Sandico February 15, 1899.

"CORBIN.

*Senate Document 208, page 158.

" MANILA.

" (Received January 25, 1900, 2.22 A. M.)

" ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington* :

" Sandico organized Manila militia, so-called ; then withdrew to Malolos ; was insurgent secretary of interior from January to May ; wore Colonel's uniform ; claimed to be a member of Aguinaldo's military staff.

" OTIS."

[Note: Since the publication of that order it has been quoted many times to illustrate the barbarity of the native Filipino. Senator Lodge and Secretary Root cite it as strong evidence that the Filipinos are incapable of self-government. Senator Lodge follows the quotation with the words, " We have no need to say that if we had left the Filipinos alone anarchy would have come, anarchy came and existed in full force wherever Aguinaldo held sway, coupled with bloodshed, pillage and corruption."

Mr. John F. Bass, Harvard, '91, correspondent for *Harper's Weekly* and the *New York Herald*, who is a man of the highest reputation and an unusually trustworthy observer, personally known to the editors, believes that the authenticity of this document is as yet unproved. Mr. Bass spent eighteen months in the Philippines and was one of the few men to learn the Tagal dialect, which enabled him to arrive at an exceptionally close understanding of the Filipinos.* He at first accepted the February 15th order as authentic, and denounced it in a letter published in *Harper's Weekly*, April 22, 1899. On reflection, however, the document seemed to him out of keeping with the character of its reputed author, Sandico, with whom Mr. Bass was personally acquainted, and he made every effort to prove its authenticity. In a letter to one of the editors under date of February 18, 1901, he makes the following statement:]

" Up to the time I left the islands† the original had never

* For Mr. Bass's opinion of the causes of the Outbreak of Hostilities, February 4, 1899, see Appendix C to this pamphlet.

* More than a year after the publication of the document.

come into American hands. No American had seen or conversed with any native who had seen the order. An enemy of Sandico, a native, presented a document which he claimed was a translation of the original made by a third native who had seen the original. This was at a time when the Provost Marshal's office was flooded with anonymous letters from natives and Spaniards accusing everybody in Manila of every crime known to criminal law. The very man who gave the alleged copy of the Sandico order, was in a fraudulent accusation against a personal enemy, a business man of Manila."

[NOTE: March 3, 1901, the following resolution, introduced by Senator Hoar, was considered by unanimous consent and agreed to :]

"Resolved: that the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby, directed to communicate to the Senate, as early as may be convenient, all information in his possession relating to or tending to show the authenticity and genuineness of the alleged order for the massacre of the foreign residents of Manila, P. I., on the evening and night of February 15, 1899 and to transmit to the Senate the full text of said order and the signatures thereto.

"And, further, to inform the Senate whether the original of said order purporting to be printed in part on page 157 of Senate Document 208, 56th Congress, 1st Session, is now or ever has been in the possession of the War Department, or of any person connected therewith or with the military authority of the United States, or whether it has ever been seen by any such person, and if it has, by whom; and to inform the Senate where the original of said order now is, if within the knowledge of the Department."

VI. A FILIPINO VERSION OF AMERICANS.

[NOTE: The following is an account in a Filipino newspaper of conduct imputed to our soldiers, which has an interest in that such publications must have been powerful in creating a prejudice in the minds of the Filipino people against American rule.]

“(Supplement to *Heraldo Filipino*,
Friday, February 24, 1899.)*

“COUNTRYMEN: Let us rejoice that the men of North America have showed themselves in their true light, for if it had not been so we must have been sunk in the mire; let us therefore thank God who has willed the war. Nothing good can be expected from these people, who, on the contrary, can teach us all the evil we wish to learn of them; the proof is that of the barbarities inflicted on our brethren in Manila. These men watch for a lack of care, an unprotected house, and then attack it.

“In order to give free rein to their infernal desires, the principles of morality are nothing to them and cannot hold them back. They have outdone the savage of the North, and have not an iota of shame or decency. They thrust their hands into dishes and take what they want, without even asking permission, or even, after taking what they want, say thanks. If they find the family sleeping the siesta they enter the room without permission from anyone, as if it were a forest. In the stores they take what they want, and, if the owner tries to collect from them, shoot him. It seems almost impossible to believe it, and our hands tremble in recording such abominations. These deeds are a shame on the nation which gives them birth. History records no more shameful deeds, even committed by a savage. Various cases have

* Senate Document 208, page 106.

occurred where women have been handled all over their persons, and their money taken from them, as well as anything else they may have, and if this happens in out-of-way places they strip their clothing from them. Are these the deeds of an honest people? Is this the people who was to teach us decency and morality? Are these to be our teachers? Such acts as these are committed by no other people on the globe. This is the nation of unrestrained liberty. This is the nation which does not know how to teach women to become mothers! This is the nation where honor is yet unknown, in a word, is a nation hated by all other nations! A nation which knows not honor, has not an atom of feeling. Are these our protectors? Better death than be related to a people whose evil is inborn. Away with the wretches. Destruction to the Americans. Down with the United States."

VII. MABINI'S MANIFESTO.*

[NOTE: The following manifesto published by Mabini, the "master spirit" of the insurrectionary movement, although of somewhat later date, seems to connect itself naturally with the foregoing. It presents the Filipino version of the intentions of the United States, and is a further example of the sort of eloquence which may have been instrumental in fostering opposition to our authority.]

"Manifesto published by Ap. Mabini, on behalf of the Philippine Government, at San Isidora, April 15, 1899.

"(The manifesto begins by summarizing the terms of the proclamation recently issued by the American commission, and published in the *Oceania* of April 5, 1899. The benevolent intentions of the American Government, its proposal to establish "an enlightened system of government under which the Philippine people may enjoy the fullest autonomy and the most complete liberty consistent with the obligation and purposes" that Government has in view, its conclusion that American sovereignty is not incompatible with the rights and liberties of the Philippine people, and its threat to overwhelm by force those who do not recognize that sovereignty are recited in some detail. The fact that the commission proposes to introduce certain improvements and reforms in the political, judicial and economic administration of the country is mentioned, and the manifesto continues as follows:)

"Such is in abstract the address to the Philippine people of the American commissioners who, to inspire greater confidence, have not hesitated to have recourse to falsehood, shamelessly asserting that my government, by not having understood the good will and fraternal sentiments of their ambitious President, has provoked war, when everybody is

* Speech of Hon. George F. Hoar in the Senate, April 17, 1900, page 65.

aware that President McKinley had to decree war in order to force the American Senators of the opposition to ratify the cession of the Philippines stipulated in the treaty of Paris, thus sacrificing to his ambition the welfare of two peoples, who ought to be united by an eternal friendship.

“You clearly see that the North American Government undertakes to extend its sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, basing its claim upon a title null and void. This title is the Treaty of Paris, agreed to by the Spanish-American Commission the 10th of last December, and ratified according to the commission that signs this address, by the American Government some weeks ago, and by that of Spain on the 20th of last March. The contract to cede the islands was concerted and concluded when the Spanish domination had already ceased in the Philippines, thanks to the triumph of our arms. Moreover, in this act of cession no voice whatever was allowed the representatives of the Philippine people to which belongs the sovereignty of the islands by natural right and international laws. What a spectacle it is to see at the end of the century, called the century of enlightenment and of civilization, a people jealous and proud of its own sovereignty employing all its great powers, the result of its own continued free existence, to wrest from another people, weak but worthy of a better fate, the very rights which in its own case it believes to be inherent by law natural and divine! And how discouraging the cold and indifferent attitude, in the face of such a scandalous usurpation, taken by the great powers to whom Providence confides the high mission and the great means of guarding universal peace and justice. But no matter! We shall fight to the last breath to revindicate our own sovereignty, our independence. If the North American people is great and powerful, far greater and more powerful is Providence which watches over the unfortunate and chastises and humbles the proud. We have suffered so much in our own interests that perhaps we are quick to recognize misery. Thus, if we should lay down our arms, we should leave our sons without

liberty and without the means of retrieving our fortune, and moreover we should bequeath to them all the penalties and sufferings of a conflict which of necessity they would have to face if to-day we do not release them from this task. If overwhelmed by misery and weighed down by the chains of servitude, you should picture to yourselves the sad future of your posterity, will you not a thousand times prefer death? To this lamentable state of despair would all those be reduced who without reflection allow themselves to be deceived by the specious promises of the American commission.

“On the other hand, these promises when examined, amount to nothing in practice. They are such as political parties ordinarily use to secure power and wholly disregard once their object is attained. For it is very easy to promise when no obligation or legal responsibility to perform the promise is incurred. And moreover — be assured of this — the North American Government has not wanted and does not want to recognize our independence, because this recognition will bind it to make formal agreement with us and not to fail or depart from the terms of this agreement. For this reason I have sought it from the beginning, but the representatives of the North American Government have always refused to accord to my government an official character, having recourse first to coercion and finally to instigating war. They promised to aid us in the attainment of our liberty, and you have seen how they have just provoked us to war for being unwilling to lose our liberty by recognizing their sovereignty.

“Apparently it pleases them better to have no sort of agreement with us, in order that they may make of us what best suits them, as soon as they have subjected us to their rule. It would be more to their advantage to promise us the greatest improvements in all kinds of industries and means of communication in order afterwards to possess themselves of our properties and control of all industries with the help of their great capital, reducing us to the condition of partners, or porters and workmen, if not mere domestics and servants. It is a clever and ingenious scheme, to promise us the amplest

autonomy and the fullest political liberty, that afterwards they may oppress us at will under the pretext that the concessions of liberty are prejudicial to their rights of sovereignty and international obligations. We were the equals of the Spaniards before the laws of Spain, but we in no case obtained justice without recourse to vile and underhand means and without incurring an interminable series of humiliations, for, wherever we betook ourselves race-hatred pursued us, and that hatred is much more violent, cruel and pitiless among the Anglo-Saxons.

"Open your eyes, my dear countrymen, while there is yet time. Fight without truce or respite, without faltering or desponding, without measuring the duration of the conflict, the forces of the enemy, or the greatness of the sacrifices. Build not on others your happiness and welfare, for selfishness and interest prevail in the relations of individuals, of cities, of nations, above all when they are separated by the impassable chasm opened by race-hatred. Even when the Constitution of the United States is declared law in the Philippine Islands and the North American Congress accords us all, absolutely all, the rights and liberties of American citizens, and a state government, recognized by the Constitution — which is the greatest good annexation can bring us — race hatred will curtail these prerogatives, especially since section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution prohibits each state from imposing taxes on imports and exports (the products of such taxes belonging to the Treasury of the United States), and from passing laws on this point without the approval of Congress. Under this section we should not be able, without the approval of the same Congress, to lay any taxes on tonnage, nor maintain in time of peace troops and warships to command respect for the liberties and rights we had acquired. Annexation, in whatever form it may be adopted, will unite us forever to a nation, whose manners and customs are different from our own, a nation which hates the colored race with a mortal hatred, and from which we could never separate ourselves except by war.

“And since war is the last resource that is left to us for the salvation of our country and our own national honor, let us fight while a grain of strength is left us: let us acquit ourselves like men, even though the lot of the present generation is conflict and sacrifice. It matters not whether we die in the midst or at the end of our most painful day's work: the generations to come, praying over our tombs, will shed for us tears of love and gratitude, and not of bitter reproach.

“By authority of the president of the republic and its government.

“AP. MABINI.

“SAN ISIDRO, April 15, 1899.”

APPENDICES.

A.

The Federated Malay States.

Copy of private letter received from Lieut. Gen. Sir Andrew Clarke, R. E., C. C. M. G., etc.

[NOTE. This letter was sent to Commissioner William R. Day by Secretary John Hay, accompanied by the following letter :

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
London, August 21, 1898.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a letter I have received from Mr. Forbes, to whom it was written by Gen. Sir Andrew Clarke, who, as I have hitherto had occasion to mention to you, is one of the greatest living authorities in England on all subjects connected with the government of the islands in the Malay Archipelago. I may add that the letter was written with the expectation that it would be transmitted to you, and I send it in the hope that you may have time to glance at it before your departure for Paris.

I am, etc.,

JOHN HAY.]

“(Confidential).”

“42 Portland Place, W., August 15, 1898.

“DEAR MR. FORBES: As the action which I took in 1874 for the pacification of the native states in the Malay Peninsula suggests a precedent for dealing with a somewhat similar condition now existing in the Philippines, I, at your request, send a note in further explanation of that action, as described in general terms by me in the paper I read last May at the Royal Institution of Great Britain.

“Very full details of this action are given in the Blue Book presented to Parliament, but some are omitted or vaguely

alluded to, one important omission being the measures I took as soon as I had learned of their existence, to secure the co-operation and support of the people who were providing the means by which alone the then state of anarchy and confusion could be maintained.

"Opening communication with these persons, I undertook to secure for them, on the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of peace and order, an ample refund of the advances they had made and a pre-emption in the share of the prosperity which would be sure to follow the restoration of tranquility to the disturbed provinces.

"Assure those who are now feeding the agitation in the Philippines that similar results will follow the adoption of similar means, and there will be no need of the thousands of troops which I see stated can alone put down Aguinaldo and the so-called rebellion.

"Aguinaldo, and the other leaders associated with him, learning that the sources from whence they draw their supplies would be no longer available, would at once come to terms, and the United States representatives in the Western Pacific would have the same experience as I had in the Malay Peninsula.

"As soon as this influence and co-operation had been secured, then, under the supreme authority and direct control of the U. S. A. the federation of the Philippines under their several chiefs and head-men would follow. This federation, as a protectorate of the U. S. A. would, under this designation, be administered under the advice and guidance of the United States officers, in accordance, as far as possible, with the natives' manners and customs, and, above all, with religion, Christian and Moslem. The laws hitherto enforced in the Philippines would remain operative for the time being, but a fiscal system similar to that of the Malay Protected States, and to that recently established at Santiago, with practically free ports, will be adopted.

"The administration of a protectorate on the lines indicated, which in the application, as in the instances of the

Malay States, have met with marked success, would give more elasticity and freedom in dealing with the very special circumstances now existing in the Philippines than direct annexation and the establishment of a Territory of the Republic of U. S. A.

"There were in 1874, as now, strong convictions that to restore order naval and military operations on a large scale would prove imperative, and that even then beneficial results in dealing with the Malay race would not be by any means assured.

"I had many warnings that nothing but failure and disaster would follow my proposed intervention into the affairs of the Malay peninsula.

"Similar predictions are now made in regard to the assertions of the United States influence in the Philippines. I believe the task would be no more difficult, and perhaps easier, than that which I accomplished in the Malay Peninsula. In some respects it is a manifest advantage to have to deal with islands which lend themselves to a political grouping.

"No doubt the presence of moderate military force will be at first desirable at one or two important centers, but I attach more value to ample naval provisions, especially of gun boats able to move freely among the islands and to ascend the many rivers and inlets of the sea.

"So to the fleet and its officers I would advise that the political and civil administration of the Philippines should, at least in the first instance, be intrusted.

"Possibly it would be well to give the admiral commanding the aid of an able and experienced lawyer, as judicial advisor, to help in the reviews and settlements of civil and criminal cases, dealt with by the existing courts of justice.

"I take it for granted that party patronage will not enter into the personnel of the staff, selected for service in the protectorate, and I have reason to believe that among officers of the United States Navy, active and retired, can be found

many men of wide experience, broad views and generous sympathy, well fitted to administer the affairs of the protectorate. For a little while, the want of knowledge of the native languages will be found of some difficulty: but this will necessitate great caution in the use of interpreters.

"Subject only to revenue demands the ports should be made as free to trade as are the Malay States of the peninsula; indeed, in this as well as in their financial and magisterial system, their practises should, as far as applicable, be followed.

"Though, from start to finish, all administrative and executive proceedings should be conducted by and under the authority of the protecting power, all public notices and documents should be in the name of the federate States.

"I anticipate little or no difficulty if the same spirit and sympathy as has ever ruled the English authority since its intervention in the affairs of the peninsula is followed in the islands with their Moslem population, but the large native Catholic population may present problems not so easy of solution.

"For the teachers and guides are of one race, while the disciples and flocks are of another.

"Much will depend upon what are the present real relations existing between the priests of the Roman Catholic Church and their congregations. On this there is much conflicting opinion.

"Whatever may be the situation, I am inclined to believe it would be both just and wise to treat the priests with full and generous consideration and secure their aid and co-operation.

"The priest or pastor of the native Catholic might be encouraged rather than otherwise by the protecting power to remain with their flocks: but the 'orders,' giving them fair compensation for their endowments, should be advised to return to Spain.

"Such a policy would secure the support of the Vatican.

"This assumes, of course, that, *without calling upon them to surrender their nationality*, they will accept loyally the

altered condition of affairs and devote themselves to reconcile their flocks to the new circumstances, submitting themselves as examples of obedience to the administration of the protectorate.

"Of course, I assume there would be [no] hesitation on the part of the United States authorities about deporting all, other than natives of the islands, who were known to oppose criminally the new order of things, and this would be applied to all priests who were known to use their influence and authority with their flocks in keeping alive agitation or disturbance.

"Much has been said and written of the oppressive conduct of the priests, and that the present rebellion is largely, if not wholly due to this.

"This may be so, but I doubt if to any great extent. To the general lax and corrupt civil administration it must rather be attributed.

"I do not anticipate any difficulty in dealing with the Chinese. They will be found at once on the side of a strong and just government.

"I am afraid these notes are very crude and incomplete, but as mere suggestions they may be of use.

"My view may, perhaps, be summed up in a single sentence. Enlist native sympathy by fairness and justice, and rule through native agents supervised by carefully selected American residents.

"If this policy is fairly tried, I am convinced that in a few years the prosperity of the protected Philippine States will astonish the world.

"Believe me, my dear Mr. Forbes, yours very faithfully,

"ANDREW CLARKE.

"True copy,

"F. B. FORBES."

“(*Private.*)

“ 24 CHENISTON GARDENS, W.

“ *My dear Mahan :* As a earnest wellwisher of your country, I am following events very carefully just now. I gather that the President and many thoughtful Americans are somewhat alarmed at the idea of assuming responsibility for the future of the Philippines, and that this at the present moment is with you a great question. It is also a great question for us, and on the ultimate decision important issues depend. Now, may I give you my opinions, offered only with my best good wishes? Spanish rule in any form in the Philippines must end. On the whole it has been worse in the East than in Cuba, because there was less publicity. If you take a waiting station and leave the islands to stew in their own juice, there will be an anarchy first and a considerable annexation afterwards.

“ Other powers will also want to look in, and of the general confusion which may arise there is only one thing that can safely be predicted; Spain will not benefit. This at least is certain. I fully see how difficult the present situation is, and I quite know how the solution may seem almost hopeless. It is most natural that America should feel chary of accepting responsibilities over the destinies of 8,000,000 people of somewhat mixed nationalities — people who can fight.

“ Yet I venture to think that in our empire there is a close parallel to the conditions in the Philippines, and that we solved the problem, as it is certain, to my mind, that you can now solve it. If you will look up the past of the native states of the Malay Peninsula, you will find conditions closely approximating to those of the Philippines. Fighting was incessant; trade and development were at a standstill. There is no corner of the world in which the development has been so swift and so perfectly successful. These native states are now prosperous and contented. Their trade has increased

by leaps and bounds. This is an advantage to us and to the rest of the world. Piracy, the joy of the Malay population has disappeared. Civilization is making rapid way.

"How has this almost miracle been accomplished? Not by troops, not by force in any form, but wholly by a policy which I suggest is now open to you. My namesake, Sir Andrew Clarke, inaugurated the policy which has led to the most astounding results. In the main it consisted only in admitting native rule, and placing by the side of each native ruler a strong and upright Englishman, who guides and restrains. If you can look into the facts, you will find that they are as I state. There is a small Sikh police whose superior officers only are English men. That is the only force applied, and in the late years there has been absolutely uninterrupted and yearly increasing prosperity. As this is only a small corner of the earth, the facts are little known even here, and Americans cannot know them.

"Well, here, I am convinced, lies your solution, and in some respects you have the advantage, because the Philippines break up easily into geographical groups, as the Malay states did not. Aguinaldo is a present difficulty, is he not? I know nothing of him: but he is evidently capable. Make him a ruler of a portion of Luzon, with a fixed salary, and put by his side an honorable and a strong man. Select other native rulers for other groups, and treat them in the same way. You will at once rally all native feeling to your side. Americans have told me that you cannot lay your hands on the right men, having no trained colonial officials. I have told them this is an illusion. You can find in your Army and Navy the few men of the right stamp who are needed. Our trained officials are not by any means the greatest of our successes. A soldier initiated the present system in the Malay Peninsula. Two sailors proved his most capable subordinates.

"Do turn this over in your mind and, if you can, get the President to look into our administration of the Malay States

and its extraordinary success. Here is a protectorate in the best sense, and it does not cost us a farthing. Have your naval stations and try this political experiment, I suggest. The results will surprise you, and they will be beneficial to the world.

“Yours very sincerely,

“G. S. CLARKE.

“ (Make any use you like of my letter.) ”

*From a “Sketch of the Federated Malay States” * by
Francis B. Forbes.*

“It is time to sum up the results which have been obtained during twenty-four years from the simple but statesmanlike conception of a protectorate which Sir Andrew Clarke first evolved in the engagement of Pangkor—an administrative experiment which stood alone at the time and had no parallel in British control over alien races elsewhere.

“All piracy and land fighting, whether by Chinese or Malays, has been absolutely stamped out. Taxation has been made very light, and yet very productive. Slavery has been suppressed. Roads and railways have been constructed in pathless forests, and jungles. Prisons and hospitals have been built and maintained. Above all, the chiefs have been reconciled to the new life, and the equality of all races and classes before the law is everywhere recognized. All this has been done, as Sir Andrew Clarke says ‘by the Residents laying down and insisting on the constant recognition of the principle that the interests of the people they were sent to govern should be the first consideration of Government officers. By learning their languages, their prejudices, their character, and by showing them that consideration which alone can secure sympathy and a good understanding between government and people, their respect and, to some extent, their affection has been won. The natural tendencies of

* Senate Document 62, page 676.

our race are not exactly inclined to these lines, and what has been done, and the present feeling as to how the natives should be treated is due to the personal influence of a succession of Residents who gained their knowledge by their own intelligence and experience.'

"In all this, as has been seen, there has been very little direct interference by the Imperial Government. It is true that in the earlier years the secretary of state for the colonies felt obliged to draw back a governor or Residents within the main lines of the policy which Great Britain had deliberately adopted, and which she was determined to see carried out. But this policy has now taken root and developed into a well-understood and working constitution, which might by chance be wrongly interpreted at times, but which it is hardly conceivable that any British officer should attempt to override.

"On the other hand no native has an object in plotting for a change. Each sultan sees his own flag flying in his kingdom and every law or decree promulgated and enforced in his name. He lives in greater state and receives more honor than ever before. His civil list is assured to him, and the public revenues, many times larger than could have been exacted by the foulest oppression of the old regime, are now largely spent in permanent improvements, which add an 'unearned increment' to the value of his private estates. The same is true of the chiefs in their degree, and as long as the people are contented under a just and beneficent administration none can ever find means to organize a revolt, for the Residents have absolute control both of the sword and of the purse. Indeed, for some years past there has been no imperial interference at all, nor is any probable under ordinary circumstances. If the power is ever exercised it will perhaps be in the direction of restraining the federation from unduly pledging its credit for foreign loans. But this contingency is still remote.

"Those who have done me the honor of reading thus far will, I am sure, have been impressed like myself by a strik-

ing fact in connection with this protectorate. I allude to the marvellous elasticity of the original organization, which has not only created a prosperous nation out of warring tribes of Malays, but, with no sharp shock to native customs or feelings, has been strong enough to exercise such acts of dominion as the despotism of a sultan, the settlement of his succession, and a general manumission of slaves.

"I may fitly conclude by quoting a few eloquent words from Sir Andrew Clarke's address before the Royal Institution:

" 'Not by wars involving the slaughter of native races, not by drafts upon the imperial exchequer, not by the agency of chartered companies, which necessarily seek first their own interests, has the development of the Malay States been attained. Their present peace and marvellous advance in prosperity have been due to a sympathetic administration, which has dealt tenderly with native prejudices and sought to lead upward a free people instead of forcibly driving a subject race.' "

*Letter from Sir Frank Swettenham.**

"CARCOSA, SELANGOR, MALAY PENINSULA.

"October 23, 1898.

"DEAR MR. SPENCER PRATT: I send you all I have at present available. It may be all you want.

"The Philippines are Malays, with more intelligence, more education, more courage, perhaps, than their confreres in the Peninsula.

"In one sense they would be easier to govern, because they have been for many years in contact with white men and understand their ways. Moreover, the majority are not Mahomedans.

"But, on the other hand, they have aspirations for political institutions, and the management of affairs without the necessary experience, perhaps without the essential qualities to secure success.

* Senate Document 62, page 493.

"I should say that our experiment in the Malay Peninsula might be successfully repeated in the Philippines, provided that the controlling power made it clearly understood at the start that they meant to control and not only to advise and educate.

"If that point were never in doubt, and the means of enforcing authority were in evidence for a short time, the rest would be easy, and I firmly believe the results would surpass all anticipations.

"Yours sincerely,

"(Signed) FRANK SWETTENHAM."

B.

General Whittier's Interview with Aguinaldo.*

"On October 25 I went, in company with H. L. Higgins, general manager of the Manila Railway, Limited, to Malolos for an interview arranged the day before with Aguinaldo. I found his headquarters were in a very nice house, ten minutes' drive from the railway station; a guard of twenty or thirty soldiers in the courtyard below.

"We were soon ushered by one of his officers, who spoke English, to the waiting room upstairs, and I met Buen Camino, a wise-looking counselor, whom I met at Ayuntamiento the day after the fall of Manila. He carried us to the presence of the insurgent leader and president, who was dressed, contrary to his usual daily garb, in a black smoking jacket, of low-cut waistcoat and trousers, both black, large white tie — in fact, the evening dress common at our clubs and during the summer.

"Buen Camino left us. I started the talk by announcing to Aguinaldo that I was to leave in a few days to appear before the Peace Commission, and that I had a very friendly feeling for the Filipinos and admiration for many of their

† Senate Document 62, 55th Cong. 3d Sess., page 503.

good qualities, their quiet, cleanliness, temperance and great initiative power, and a possibility of learning almost any profession or business; that I would like to be able to present to the Commission his and his people's views and demands and what relations they expected to hold to the United States in case we decided to keep the islands.

"Aguinaldo replied, rather naively, that his people were divided into two parties — those in favor of absolute independence and those of an American protectorate; that the parties are about equal; that he is waiting to see who will have the majority, in that case to take his position. I pointed out to him that it would probably be useless to try to bring those in favor of absolute independence to any change of opinion, but they must consider that they are without any navy and without capital, which is greatly needed for the development of the country; that the Philippine Government alone did not possess the element of strength to insure the retention of the islands without the assistance of other governments. They would be at the mercy of any of half a dozen powers striving to take either a part or the whole of the islands, and they must consider that their greatest prosperity would come by the gradual accession of power under American auspices.

"He said: 'But the civilized nations of the world would see that our possessions were not taken from us.' I replied: 'How has it been in China, where England, Russia, France, Germany, etc., all strive to control territory?' To this he could make no reply. I further asked what that side would expect America, acting the role of protector, to do. He said: 'To furnish the navy, while the Filipinos held all the country and administered civil offices with its own people.' 'And what then would America get from this?' said I. 'That would be a detail,' he said, 'which would be settled hereafter.'

"I asked how far they controlled Luzon and the other islands. 'Almost entirely,' he said. That the different bands, little by little, were expressing their desire to join him.

•

The Igorrothos had sent in some of their leaders the day before and were acting with him. That he had had three representatives from Iloilo within a few days on the same mission.

"We pursued all this subject of a protectorate for some time without getting any nearer any satisfactory result. Mr. Higgins felt that Aguinaldo had been simply repeating a lesson, but I did not feel so sure of that. He said he had had many Americans to interview him, most of them reporters, I fancy, and he had always told them the same thing. Thereupon I stated that this was quite a different case. 'I am ordered, as an officer of the United States Army, to proceed to Paris and give evidence on points which may be of vital interest to you.' After this his tone was different. Buen Camino returned, and Aguinaldo reported to him everything he had said to us. After a little talk between the two, Buen Camino said he, and he was sure the president, was in favor of an American protectorate, and seemed to approve the suggestion that we should have the nucleus of an army; that his people should be joined to it, filling the places of minor officers; and the possibility and hope within a few years that they should fill the most important civil and military functions.

"Buen Camino said I could be certain that if a protectorate were granted that they would do their best to have it accepted by their people on the lines that I have stated, agreeing with me fully that to hold one island and giving the others to other powers would be most unfortunate, and not to be considered.

"They expressed pleasure at my having come to them, feeling that they had been rather neglected by the Americans.

"This I dictated hastily just after the visit, and it does not give the impression which the interview left upon me — a great desire for our protection, for the improvement of their people materially and intellectually, the wish to send their young people to America for education.

"Subsequently (October 31, the day I left Manila) he sent three officers to me with the friendliest messages, expressing the wish that I should use my best influence with the commission in their favor."

C.

Outbreak of Hostilities.

*From Letter of Mr. John F. Bass.**

"Newcomers in Manila keep asking where the blame lies for this outbreak. Is the responsibility, alike for American and Filipino deaths, with our government or with the leaders of the Filipino people? At such a time as this it is difficult for a good American not to throw all the blame on Aguinaldo and his followers. The American army has done so well that one feels like overlooking the past. Although the true cause does not lie within the scope of any generalization, but rather in a multitude of small detached facts, still I believe that the fundamental reason for our present fight lies in an unrestrained race antipathy. Americans differ so absolutely in mind, body and soul from Filipinos that the two could not live together in harmony under the then existing conditions. First among these conditions was an American and a Filipino volunteer force, both more or less undisciplined and longing to jump at each other's throats; and secondly, a want of any consistent policy in our government. Moreover both American and Filipino leaders have been so provincial in their point of view that at no time during the military occupation of Manila has the least good feeling existed between the American and Filipino governments. We have ignored Aguinaldo and his followers in so far as it is possible to ignore an army which for months has been encircling Manila in a peaceful siege. Aguinaldo has stuck out through thick and thin for the independence of his people. Instead

* *Harpers' Weekly*, April 22, 1899, page 429.

of getting what he wanted, he received the hard and fast declaration of our President that the islands were American property, that the army would proceed to take possession of them, and that any one resisting our authority would be suppressed by force of arms. Since this manifesto was issued there has been no hope of a peaceful settlement.

"The bone of contention is the sovereignty of the islands. It is said that the Filipinos will not be able to establish a good government, but the same argument would apply to many of our own communities at home, which have wretched local self-government. Much as one may dislike the native, — and I must say that I have never met a more unlovable people, — it is important occasionally to get his point of view. No doubt the government which the natives would establish would not please the Anglo-Saxon, but would it not be good enough for the natives themselves?

"The natives soon learned to dislike us. We plastered the town from end to end with beer and whiskey advertisements. And thus far Americans who have followed the army have put their time and money into saloons. No other business attracts them. According to native standards the American soldier has been rough and tyrannical, while from our point of view the natives have been tricky and dishonest. The extreme East and the extreme West have learned to hate each other.

"The importance of these things is great as indicating what the future has in store. The immediate cause of the outbreak was that the insurgent officers and soldiers, being under less control than our men became so hostile and insulting that we had either to fight or leave the islands. The outbreak was hastened and made inevitable by the unsettled state of public opinion in the United States, the absence of any fixed policy in Washington and the consequent contradicting and restricting orders on our local government in Manila. The fact of the matter is that the policy of ignoring the insurgents completely has had its origin in Washington. It reminds me of the ultra-idealistic philosopher who ignored

the hard and fast world of environment, and while absorbed in thought bumped his head against a stone wall. The insurgent government is here and must be dealt with.

"Formerly we might have compromised with them; now we must crush them. There are a few men of education and ability who are encouraging the insurrection, the rest of the army follows blindly, misled by false reports about our cruelty, and they look upon us now as a species of ogre. We have fallen heir to the hatred which the natives felt for the Spaniards, and the same things are told about us that were told about our predecessors.

"The Spaniards and the priests have done what they could to make trouble by circulating false reports in both camps. These reports have been believed by the insurgents and in many instances by our own officers. The Spaniards are jubilant over the present state of affairs. One of them said to me:

" 'I speak to you as a Spaniard and an enemy of the United States. If fifty insurgents are killed, good: if the insurgents kill one hundred Americans, better: if the Americans in turn kill two hundred insurgents, best of all! ' "

PART II

SEEKING AN ARMISTICE

APRIL AND MAY 1899.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	5
MABINI'S LETTERS	7
INTERVIEW WITH LEADING CITIZENS	10
INTERVIEW WITH AGUINALDO'S EMISSARIES	21
INTERVIEW WITH SEÑOR MELLIZA	37

SEEKING AN ARMISTICE.

INTRODUCTION.

THE first commission to the Philippines, popularly called the Schurman Commission, was appointed in January, 1899. The Commission was composed of Jacob Gould Schurman, President of Cornell University; Major-General Elwell S. Otis, U. S. V. (who did not sign the report); Rear Admiral George Dewey, U. S. N.; Colonel Charles Denby, of Indiana; and Dean C. Worcester, Professor of Zoölogy in the University of Michigan. The Commission was appointed "in order to facilitate the most humane, pacific and effective extension of authority throughout these islands, and to secure, with the least possible delay, the benefits of a wise and generous protection of life and property to the inhabitants." (See President's Instructions to the Commission, vol. 1, Report of Commission, p. 185.) At that time hostilities had not broken out at Manila, nor had the Treaty of Peace been acted upon by the Senate.* Messrs. Schurman and Worcester of the Commission reached Manila March 4, 1899; Colonel Denby arrived April 2, 1899. Finding on their arrival that war was in existence the Commissioners state that they "sought in every possible way"¹ to "bring about peace."² They state that they "early became convinced that the Tagalog rebellion was due to the ambition of a few and the misunderstanding of the many,"³ and accordingly issued, on April 4, a proclamation which should "clear away much misunderstanding."⁴ (See Appendix A to this pamphlet.)

*The treaty of peace was signed by the Commissioners in Paris, December 10, 1898. January 4, 1899, it was sent to the Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Hostilities broke out February 4, 1899. February 6, 1899, the treaty was ratified by the Senate, with a single vote to spare. February 10, 1899, it was signed by the President. March 20, 1899, ratified by Spain.

¹ and ² Report of Commission, vol. I., page 2. ³ and ⁴ Report of Commission, vol. I., page 3.

It should be remarked in connection with the words "Tagalog rebellion" that the Commissioners apparently overlooked the Iloilo episode of January, 1899, wherein the Viscayans disputed our right to the island of Panay, and professed allegiance to the central government in Luzon, thus constituting themselves a part of the rebellion. (See Otis' Report and also pamphlet VI. of this series.) Further, when the United States troops took forcible possession of Iloilo, February 10, hostilities were thereby extended into Panay, the leading island of the Viscayan group.

The proclamation issued by the Commission led to frequent interviews with Filipinos who came either upon their own responsibility or as emissaries sent by the insurgent government. The interviewers seem always to have had the same mission, namely, "to ask a suspension of hostilities in order that they might have a period of quiet in which to discuss among themselves and among their people the advisability of seeking terms of peace, and coming to an understanding as to the forms of government and the rights and privileges which would be secured to them according to the spirit and words of the proclamation." (Report of Philippine Commission, vol. I., page 7.)

It is impossible to tell how many such interviews took place, as the Commissioners' Report is somewhat vague on this point, and General Otis in his report seems to refer to some interviews which the Commissioners do not specifically mention. The conferences with the Commission may be roughly divided into three groups: 1. Interviews early in April with Arguelles, an emissary of Aguinaldo, who came several times alone, and at other times with one Captain Zialcita. 2. An interview on April 21 with certain leading citizens of Manila.* 3. Interviews in the latter part of May with emissaries of Aguinaldo.

None of the interviews with Arguelles are reported in the second volume of the Report of the Commission which gives the stenographic accounts of many interviews; but a communication from the insurgent government, signed by Mabini, which Arguelles presented on one occasion, is printed in the first volume, and is reprinted below.

*This interview is not mentioned in the first volume of the Report, where the other interviews are summarized, but a verbatim account of it is given in volume II., and is reprinted in this pamphlet, pages 10 to 21.

MABIN'S LETTERS.

[From the Report of the Philippine Commission, Vol. I, p. 187.]

"SAN ISIDRO, April 29, 1899.

"HONORABLE GENTLEMEN,—The Philippine people through its government, makes known to the commission that it has not yet lost its confidence in the friendship, justice, and magnanimity of the North American nation.

"It feels itself weak before the advance of the American troops, whose valor it admires, and in view of the superiority of their organization, discipline, fighting material, and other resources, does not feel humiliated in soliciting peace, invoking the generous sentiments of the Government of the North American people, worthily represented by the commission, and the sacred interests of humanity.

"But the Philippine Government, fully convinced that it has not provoked war, and that it has only employed its arms in defence of the integrity of its native land, asks for suspension of hostilities and a general armistice in all the Archipelago for the short time of three months, in order to enable it to consult the opinions of the people consulting the government which would be most advantageous, and the intervention in it which should be given to the North American Government, and to appoint an extraordinary commission with full powers to act in the name of the Philippine people.

"The welfare of this unfortunate country and the triumph of the governing party in the United States of America, depend upon the prompt establishment of peace. We confess ourselves weak, but we still possess resources—above all, the unfaltering resolution to prolong the war for an indefinite space of time, if the undertaking to dominate us by force is persisted in.

"In laying before the commission the preceding statements I believe that I interpret the sentiments of my President and his government and those of the Philippine people.

"I salute the commission with the greatest respect.

"Your most obedient servant,

"AP. MABINI.*

"(Seal.)

"The members of the Philippine Government have commissioned Col. Manuel Arguelles to present and explain to the North American commission to the Philippines the following points:

"FIRST. The Philippine Government finds itself compelled to negotiate an armistice and a suspension of hostilities as an indispensable means of arriving at peace; in the first place, in order to justify itself before its people as having employed all the means in its power to avoid the ruin of the country, and in the second place, to offer to the commission a means of putting an end to the war in a manner most honorable to the American Army and most glorious to the Government of the United States.

"SECOND. It does not solicit the armistice to gain a space of time in which to re-enforce itself, nor does it expect aid from Japan nor from any other nation, as no government up to the present time has recognized its belligerency, nor is disposed to injure its relations with powerful America, especially as there is nothing to be gained thereby. The Philippine Government earnestly desiring the felicity of its people, while it is still in the pursuit of independence, would not insist upon fighting for its ideal if the Philippine people through its accredited representatives should ask for peace and accept autonomy.

"THIRD. The interests of humanity are at present in harmony with those of the North American Government, and both ask for a brief space of time, however short, in which the Philippine people may reflect upon their sad situation and may understand the bases of the autonomy which is offered to them.

"FOURTH. If, however, this last recourse is denied it, no one can blame the Philippine Government for the tenacity which it may show. The honor of the army and the happiness of the country

* General Otis, in his Report for 1899, page 75, calls Mabini Aguinaldo's "able adviser," and "the man who had furnished the brains," and "who, in fact, was the government" of the insurgents. He is at present, or was recently, on parole as an American prisoner.

will then determine the only line of conduct for it to pursue, namely, to prolong the struggle until it reaches the end of its resources. This prolongation of the struggle would be fatal to both peoples.

"Let the commission reflect, then, while there is time, that if the war is converted into a national war it would be very difficult to keep it within bounds.

"In that case peace would mean the annihilation of the Philippine people or that of the imperialistic party of America.

"AP. MABINI.

"SAN ISIDRO, May 1, 1899.

"(Lead Pencil Note.) If this is refused, notify them that a move will be made for foreign intervention upon the grounds of commercial interests, which are seriously prejudiced by the prolongation of war, and that a manifesto will be published making known to the world the reasons for the war."

[NOTE. In the first volume of their Report, page 7, the Commissioners summarize certain points brought out in the interviews with the Filipinos in the following words:

"One matter, however, they were told could not be discussed: that was the sovereignty of the United States. That matter, it was said, had been settled by the treaty of Paris, and being so settled was a fact which was now beyond the realm of profitable discussion. Speaking of the matter of independence, the Commission pointed out that by the ninth article of the Treaty of Paris it was provided that the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants were to be determined by Congress."

In this connection, the editors venture to emphasize two points which are important to an understanding of the interviews below quoted, and which are brought out more prominently in Otis's Report, and in Senate Document 208 (56th Congress, 1st Session,) than in the Report of the Schurman Commission.

I. The Filipinos did not consider a reference to the Treaty of Paris final, inasmuch as they denied the right of Spain to sell a territory of which they claimed their own government was in possession before the treaty was negotiated.

II. The Commissioners' statement that until the Filipinos laid down their arms they could not be told what form of "organic law" would be ultimately granted them, but must trust for that to a subsequent action of Congress, seems to have filled them with sus-

picion. If it is hard for us to sympathize with this suspicion, we should remember that their former treatment by the Spaniards had made them distrustful of those in authority over them, and that their distrust of us must have been heightened by the Spanish version of our ill-treatment of the Indians in this country. Further, we must remember that in spite of our repeated assurances within the previous year that our only desire was for the welfare of the Filipinos, and that they might safely rely upon our honor and our humanity, we were then engaged in what they conceived to be a war of conquest. However mistakenly, they were certainly persuaded that the sovereignty of the United States involved for them a mere change of masters; and unquestionably this belief must have weakened the effect of the Commissioners' assurances that our Congress could be trusted to provide them with a liberal government.]

INTERVIEW WITH LEADING CITIZENS OF MANILA.

[From Report of the Philippine Commission, Vol. II, p. 61-67.]

"Testimony of Senors Tavera and Tolentino.

"MANILA, April 21, 1899.

"Present: President Schurman (in the chair), Colonel Denby, and Prof. Dean C. Worcester; John R. MacArthur, Esq., secretary and counsel. Also Dr. Pardo de Tavera, and Señor Aurelio Tolentino.

"President SCHURMAN. Gentlemen, we are very happy to receive you, and hope that you will state freely to us whatever you have to say.

"Dr. TAVERA. Mr. President and gentlemen of the Commission, there has been a commission formed of Filipinos to meet the American Commission and see what would be the most efficacious and rapid way of bringing peace to this people. I am a member

of this commission and I have the honor of knowing Señor Aurelio Tolentino, who has asked me to present him that he may meet you.

"Colonel DENBY. Is he a member of the commission?

"Dr. TAVERA. Señor Tolentino has been one of the most active members of the Filipino revolution against the Spanish, and naturally he preserves the prestige among the Filipinos of being a decided patriot.

"President SCHURMAN. Is he a member of your commission?

"Dr. TAVERA. Yes, sir. Now that I have spoken the words presenting Mr. Tolentino, the commission can speak directly to him.

"President SCHURMAN. Perhaps we can proceed in a more orderly manner if you will permit us to ask you a few questions.

"Señor TOLÉNTINO. Certainly, sir.

"AURELIO TOLÉNTINO, stated as follows, in response to inquiries by the commission:

"By President SCHURMAN:

"Q. What is your name?—A. Aurelio Tolentino.

"Q. From what part of the country do you come?—A. I have never gone out of Manila.

"Professor WORCESTER. I don't believe that is what he means.

"Question repeated.—A. I am from the town of Guayo, in the province of Bantangas.

"Q. How long have you resided there?—A. I was born there, but at the age of 23 I was employed in the Spanish offices. Afterwards, as a notary in Morong.

"Q. How long did you stay in Morong?—A. One year.

"Q. And since that time where have you lived?—A. In September, 1896, two weeks after the breaking out of the revolution, they took me out of my house, arrested me, applied an electric machine to me and put chains upon my feet.

"Q. They tortured you?—A. Yes, in Manila, in Bilibid, the presidio, in the penitentiary, in the central police station, and everywhere.

"Q. How long were you a prisoner?—A. Nine months.

"By Professor WORCESTER:

"Q. Why did they torture you?—A. Because when an educated Filipino was not a friend of the priests they always put him in prison, and in Morong I was not a great friend of the priests; and

they tortured me for the purpose of getting a confession from me in regard to the occurrences of the revolution.

“Q. Have you been engaged with the insurrectos?—A. At first, no, sir; afterwards, yes, sir; because my heart demanded vengeance for having taken me to jail when I was not to blame.

“Q. Of what profession are you?—A. A notary.

“Q. How long were you a Spanish official altogether?—A. From 1891 to 1896.

“Q. What have you done since 1896?—A. They put me in jail. After that I lived in my house, because I did not wish to take the field, having my family with me, my mother and my wife; and then there were secret police of the Spanish living opposite my house, and considering that I was not safe with the Spanish secret police living just opposite to me, I thought it was necessary to take to the field.

“President SCHURMAN. Dr. Tavera, I would like to ask you a question. I understand there are certain matters about which this gentleman would like to speak to us. Is that so? If it is, I would think it desirable to give him the word and let him state what he wishes to say.

“Señor TOLENTINO. My opinion is as follows, Mr. President: As a true Filipino, always desiring the well-being of my native land, as a son desires the welfare of his mother, I see that war is the same thing for a nation as sickness for a man. It is not an ordinary sickness, but a severe and dangerous sickness, and I being a true Filipino and a true son, and one that loves his mother, naturally love my native land, the Philippines, and desire whatever means may be taken to cure this sickness. I do not consider that I have the right to give a remedy to my native land, because, in the first place, I am only one, and, in the second place, I have not the capacity to do so; but, nevertheless, a commission of Filipinos has been formed with the object of administering this remedy, and whatever the opinion of the commission will be, it will be my opinion also. I bow to that opinion always, when the opinion does not lengthen the war, but if the opinion of that commission tends to lengthen the war, I am not agreeable to it, for my desire is to administer the remedy to cure this sickness. In view of what I have said, and, finally, of the fact that I have been chosen by the commission to be the member to carry their messages and letters to the Filipino government—that is, the Filipino commission has

named me to carry their messages and letters to the government of Aguinaldo —

“Q. To Aguinaldo himself?—A. To Aguinaldo and others who constitute the government.

“By Professor WORCESTER:

“Q. When do you expect to start?—A. The sooner the better, for every day of war is a great damage to our country; if I can go to-day, so much the better. I do not wish to see another drop of blood spilled.

“President SCHURMAN. Your mission is a most important one and we wish you all success in it.

“Señor TOLENTINO. Many thanks. When I come to Aguinaldo it is probable that he and some of the persons there will ask me about these questions, and what answers can be given? If they should ask me—and they will ask me—“What does the American Government want of the Philippine people?” I wish to ask the gentlemen who form the commission, if they see fit to tell me, whether in reply to that question I am to remain with my mouth closed and answer “I do not know,” or whether they will give me some answer to make.

“President SCHURMAN. Our answer to this question is already contained in our proclamation of the fourth of this month.—A. Yes, sir.

“(At this point in the proceedings the following members of the Filipino commission entered the room and were presented to the United States commissioners by Dr. Tavera: Señors Tomas G. del Rosario, Florentine Torres, Luis R. Yanco, and F. R. Yanco.)

“At the suggestion of President Schurman, the Filipino commissioners were informed of the interview which had previously taken place between President Schurman and Señor Tolentino.

“Colonel DENBY. Señor Tolentino, will you, or one of your confrères, tell us what you want to know which is not contained in the proclamation?

“Señor TORRES. Last Sunday there was a meeting of citizens of Manila—lawyers, doctors, business men, etc.—for the purpose of coming to some arrangement with the Philippine government, in order to secure peace, and of sending a communication to them so as to arrange to meet some delegates of theirs. Letters will be sent from various influential persons in Manila to the Filipinos,

with the idea of coming to some arrangement with them by which they will arrange peace with the American commission.

"President SCHURMAN. Your mission is a very important one and we wish you all success in it.

"Señor TORRES. Señor Tolentino will carry the letters and also will talk to them with the idea of seeing if some understanding can not be arranged. Señor Rosario has written asking permission that he may also go.

"President SCHURMAN. Señor Rosario, would you like to say something?

"Señor ROSARIO. Yes; I am writing two letters, one to Mr. Luna, who is chief of the army, and the other to Mr. Buencamino, who is the secretary of Don Emilio Aguinaldo. I say in these letters that the most influential citizens of Manila have come together to try and secure peace. I have stated in these letters that if they wish more details I will not find it inconvenient to go to them. I have also asked them for a pass, for in time of war many people are suspected and there is danger, and I would also like to have the American commission tell me something that I may say to them before I go.

"President SCHURMAN. We desire to assure you and your confrères once more that we hope you will be successful in bringing about peace.

"Señor ROSARIO. I, as vice-president of the congress of Malolos, shall express to the congress the impressions which I carry from here.

"President SCHURMAN. We give you to take to them, as expressing our views and sentiments, copies of our proclamation. We issued a proclamation on the 4th of this month, and we thought that was sufficient.

"Señor ROSARIO. I said that I wished to take some expressions from the American commission, because the first thing that they will ask me will be, "What sort of autonomy is this that the American commission offers us?"

"President SCHURMAN. It is the autonomy described in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the proclamation.

"Señor ROSARIO. Very well. I have read this (referring to the proclamation), but perhaps they will want some further detail. I wish to say to your commission that I have come to you as the vice-president of the Filipino congress, and I make this as a per-

sonal statement, that what they wish is independence under the protection of the United States.

“President SCHURMAN. It is not possible to discuss the question of American sovereignty — that is an established fact.

“Señor ROSARIO. It is not to discuss the sovereignty of America; I only wish to inform the commission of the political atmosphere which exists there, and I perhaps may be able to convince them that the autonomy which your commission offers will be a greater advantage than the independence which they desire.

“President SCHURMAN. We are studying the question. We desire to get information from leading Filipinos in all parts of the country, and if a conference were held, that would be the time for details and not now. Only we can say this, that we do look forward to giving them an extremely liberal form of government. Gentlemen, the question you have asked us is one which we would like to consider, and we must, therefore, ask you to excuse us for a few minutes for consultation.

“The United States commissioners here retired from the room.

“The United States commissioners, on returning to the room, presented to Dr. Tavera a written statement, which is as follows :

“‘We have to inform the gentlemen that this commission is composed of five members, only three of whom are present to-day, consequently it is impossible to answer in detail the question as to the exact form of government to be established by the United States in the archipelago; but we have to say that we are studying the question, and, as indicated in the proclamation, desire to consult with prominent Filipinos from all parts of the archipelago, and in the meantime can assert that an exceedingly liberal form of government is contemplated, the commission being opposed to the system of colonial servitude. The commission desires also to inform these gentlemen that we shall be glad to consult with them at any time hereafter, or with other prominent Filipinos, and that we shall be pleased to participate in a formal conference when such has been arranged.’

“The above paper was translated into Spanish by Dr. Tavera, and by him read aloud in Spanish to the Filipino gentlemen, after which Dr. Tavera returned the paper to the stenographer.

“Señor TORRES. On account of some remarks of Señor Rosario, I think that the most practical method would be to establish an autonomous constitution. Some days ago I secured a meeting

with General Otis, in which I gave an account of the meeting of Sunday, and after having told him what happened on last Sunday I told him of the spirit of the meeting. I told him that the predominant opinion was lack of confidence, as the first question which was asked me, as president of the meeting, was: "What sort of autonomy is this that the American proclamation offers us?" and, therefore, I told General Otis that the best thing would be for the commission to give me an organized project of the laws which they intended to propose; but General Otis said that it was impossible to do this without consulting the authorities at Washington. General Otis said that he would admit to no other government, but what I proposed was that he give me a form of the organic law, which would be held in abeyance at present, and that, given such a scheme, if the commission saw fit to listen to us, and if the scheme fulfilled our aspirations, we now, with arms in our hands, would not find it impossible to recognize the sovereignty of America. This suggestion I again make to-day, and think that the intended laws should be made up and put into shape. I make this suggestion before the commission, with the supposition that the Filipinos who are present agree with me; and I may add that a number of people who are outside, and with whom I have talked, are agreeable to this, and are awaiting for this.

"By Prof. WORCESTER:

"Q. When you say outside, do you mean outside of the building or outside of your junta?—A. I mean in Manila and its suburbs, people outside of our commission; and the suggestion being made, I ask the commission to have the goodness to listen to the Filipinos in regard to this.

"Colonel DENBY. Please explain what you mean by an autonomous government.

"Señor ROSARIO. The government of the Filipinos by the Philippine people under the direction or intervention of the United States.

"By President SCHURMAN:

"Q. Would you contemplate a governor appointed by the President of the United States?—A. Yes, sir: that is the recognition of the sovereignty.

"Q. And the cabinet?—A. It should be of Filipinos.

"By President SCHURMAN:

"Q. Appointed by the President of the United States?—A. By the American governor-general.

"By Colonel DENBY :

"Q. Do you mean by that cabinet, a secretary of the interior, a secretary of war, postmaster-general, secretary of the navy, and such officers as we have in our Cabinet?—A. Ministers of the interior, of war, of public instruction, and everything except of justice.

"Q. Why do you except justice?—A. For we wish to have the administration of justice apart from the government—separate from the government.

"By President SCHURMAN :

"Q. You do not include the ministers of war and marine?—A. The management of war and of the marine will be under the immediate direction of the United States.

"By Colonel DENBY :

"Q. Who would collect the customs?—A. I should wish that he might be a Filipino, but I do not know what are the intentions of the United States Government.

"Q. We don't ask you what should be the nationality of the collector, but I ask you to whom should be paid the customs, to the Government of the United States or to the government of the Philippines?—A. To the treasury of the nation—to the treasurer.

"Q. Not to the United States?—A. For my part—I only speak for myself, and I have not talked with my companions over the details—I am willing personally myself to agree to anything just and reasonable.

"By President SCHURMAN :

"Q. Does the autonomous form of government which you have in mind contemplate a legislature?—A. A chamber of representatives elected by suffrage.

"Q. Universal suffrage or limited suffrage?—A. I, myself, would say universal, but considering my colleagues I am willing to say it should be limited for the present.

"Professor WORCESTER. When you say for yourself 'universal suffrage' would you include the Igorrotes in this island—Luzon—the Manguianes of Mindoro, and the Moros of Mindanao?

"Señor ROSARIO. Among these Moros and Igorrotes there are many unenlightened people, and for this reason they should have

limited suffrage; but at the same time there are many of them enlightened people. In my province there are Igorrotes called Aetas, who have European cast of features, but are very black and have curly hair, and these have a government to themselves and have always been completely independent of Spanish rule, which government might serve as a model. When the commission wishes to go there I could accompany them, for I take many people there to show them these people.

"President SCHURMAN. Many thanks.

"Señor TORRES. I am now going to answer the argument of Mr. Worcester in regard to universal suffrage as applied to the Igorrotes, the Moros, etc. I think that if universal suffrage were conceded to the Moros and Igorrotes under certain conditions it would be the means of bringing them to civilized life.

"President SCHURMAN. I understand you gentlemen to favor a limitation of the suffrage. In what way would you limit it?

"Señor ROSARIO. That all who know how to write should have the right to vote.

"Professor WORCESTER. Even if they have no property and are thieves?

"Señor ROSARIO. It is difficult in the Philippine Islands, and in all parts of the world, for I have travelled a great deal, to find anybody who owns property who does not know how to write.

"Professor WORCESTER. It is sometimes easy to find people who know how to write, but who do not know how to vote.

"Señor ROSARIO. But these people—thieves and such people—could not vote anyhow, because they are incapacitated by law.

"Colonel DENBY. In your contemplated form of government have you made any arrangement as to who should be charged with the foreign relations?

"Señor TORRES. The United States.

"President SCHURMAN. And the post-office?

"Señor TORRES. That is a detail, too, although a very important one; but I think that it might be administered by a secretary from this country under the direction, of course, of the United States, as all other postal matters. The governor-general would hold the veto and also intervention.

"Colonel DENBY. Could you draw such a form of government and submit it to us in writing as your views with regard to that question, and, of course, the views of those who join with you?

I ask you primarily because I understand you are a lawyer and perfectly capable of drawing such a paper.

"Señor TORRES. We will form a small commission among ourselves to draw up such a plan, and we appreciate the deference of the commission in allowing us to do so.

"President SCHURMAN. We will have much pleasure in receiving it.

"Colonel DENBY. Because we would like to compare it with our own views.

"Señor TORRES. The plan which I shall present will not be simply my plan, but it will be the plan of several of us, because I have no confidence in the small man that I am.

"Colonel DENBY. We want it to compare with our own views and to see if we cannot come together.

"Señor TORRES. The reason that we did not put in a plan of an autonomous government was that we were waiting for the commission to indicate a plan to us.

"Colonel DENBY. The object of the commission is to find out the views of all the respectable and influential people whom we can get to tell them to us, and when we go over them we will come to some conclusion.

"Señor TORRES. I beg the commission that they will not wait to listen to all the ideas and plans of the people in the provinces of Luzon and Visaya.

"President SCHURMAN. We see a good many of them here in Manila without going to these provinces, of course.

"Señor TORRES. I wish to say one word. I know more or less the opinions of those who are in the provinces, and I have confidence in saying that they will be agreeable to what we decide upon, for they think that we know a little something about affairs.

"Professor WORCESTER. Will you include in that number those who have arms in their hands at the present time?

"Señor TORRES. For that reason we wish something in writing, to be able to convince them of the granting of what they consider right and proper by the American people. The last thing I have to say is that the greatest enlightenment among the people will be found in Manila and not in the provinces.

"Professor WORCESTER. For just that reason we need to see something of the provinces, because we must make a government

that will answer for the enlightened people and for those who are not enlightened.

“SEÑOR TORRES. I will answer that. In respect to the people who are not enlightened, I think that a government may be arranged for both classes, for the enlightened and the unenlightened, so that the enlightened may be satisfied, and those who are not enlightened may be educated.

“SEÑOR ROSARIO. General Otis spoke to me about this question and I gave him an easy solution—that the American commission come to an understanding with the Philippine Assembly, for they are the representatives of all.

“PROFESSOR WORCESTER. Is there a representative there from the province of Calamianis?

“SEÑOR ROSARIO. I think so; yes.

“By President SCHURMAN:

“Q. Is there a representative there for Palawan or Paragua?—

A. I could not say. But General Otis said it was inconvenient, because he asked, “Where are we to consult with them, in Malolos?” I answered him, “No; but let them come to Manila.” I asked General Otis not to go all about into all the provinces; that it would be easy to convoke an assembly here in Manila. I should wish that such an assembly should meet here in Manila; and, if the commission will give me permission, I will convince them that it is the best thing to come here; I will persuade them to come here when I go.

“President SCHURMAN. That is a question which the commission will consider.

“SEÑOR ROSARIO. It might be inconvenient for the commission to call them as an assembly, such as they are, for it would be a sort of recognition of the Philippine government, but I suggested to General Otis that to summon them as private persons, one by one, and to give each a guarantee of safety that he would not be molested in the city would answer.

“SEÑOR TORRES. I wish to add a last word: That there will be no difficulty over the question of money. I speak not only for myself, but for others whom I have heard talk; that the enlightened people will be content if their aspirations are fulfilled, even if they spend more or less. The complaint of the people was not that Spain took the money, but it was that the employees took their money and spent it. There are many towns which are able

to pay taxes to an intelligent and moral government. And if the commission wishes, I will tell the legislative assembly that they come as private persons to meet the commission here in Manila.

"President SCHURMAN. That is a matter, as I said before, which the commission will consider.

"Señor TORRES. And in regard to the plan of an autonomous government, do you wish to wait or shall we do it?

"President SCHURMAN. Go to work at it now.

"Señor TORRES. I shall, then, visit my friends and neighbors who are interested in this thing, but we will need some days to do it.

"President SCHURMAN. I want to say with regard to the constitution, to the project of an autonomous government, that the object of our procuring such a draft from you is to compare it with our own ideas and see if, in our opinion, an adjustment can be made.

"The meeting adjourned."

INTERVIEW WITH AGUINALDO'S EMISSARIES.

[From Report of the Philippine Commission, Vol. II, pp. 116-127.]

"Interview with Senores Gonzaga, Pilar, Barreto, Zialcita.

"MANILA, May 22, 1899.

"Present: President Jacob Gould Schurman, in the chair; Col. Charles Denby and Prof. Dean C. Worcester, commissioners; and Mr. John R. MacArthur, secretary. Also present: Señor Gracio Gonzaga, Señor Gregorio del Pilar, Señor Alberto Barreto, Capt. Lorenzo Zialcita.

"President SCHURMAN. Will you have the goodness to state from whom you come, gentlemen.

"Señor GONZAGA. We are emissaries of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo.

"President SCHURMAN. Of course, you understand we do not recognize any government in the Archipelago except the Government of the United States.

"(To this statement Señor Gonzaga and his companions made no reply, but bowed.)

"Nevertheless, we are exceedingly glad to meet such distinguished gentlemen and converse with you on the situation here.

"Señor GONZAGA. Many thanks.

"President SCHURMAN. Our commission has something authoritative to say from the President of the United States.

"Señor GONZAGA. Our commission has the honor to salute the American commission and fulfil its duty in doing so, and also wishes, on the part of General Aguinaldo, to state that the General is anxious to finish this war; that he knows that war is harmful to the country, and that it is his desire to terminate it.

"President SCHURMAN. This commission, on behalf of the President of the United States, desires to reciprocate that sentiment.

"Señor GONZAGA. For this reason the gentleman whom we represent has sent this commission here to hear the plan of government which your commission will propose, and which they think fitting for the country, in order that he may explain it to the people.

"President SCHURMAN. I will now explain the plan definitely proposed by the President of the United States.

"(At this juncture there was read the cablegram of May 5, 1899. See Vol. I, p. 9.) *

"President SCHURMAN. I received a telegram in those words from the President of the United States.

"Señor GONZAGA. Our general, in his ardent desire for the good of his people — for he has no other desire — wishes to present the plan of government, which the American Government wishes to implant here, to the people, in order that the Philippine people may consider it and study it well; and should they accept it, he himself is perfectly agreeable. Whatever may be the form of the government which the United States may see fit to establish in these islands, and although we know that you do not recognize our government, it should be remembered that General Aguinaldo has established a government here, of which he is the President, which is a republican form of government, and this being taken into account he must consult the people, in order that peace may be eternal and may be true peace. For, although he might make

* Appendix B of this pamphlet.

peace and sign it, if the army is not agreeable to this, or if the people are not agreeable to this, the peace would not be final and eternal; it would only be temporary peace. With this end in view, he wishes to be thoroughly familiar with the plan of government in all its details, in order that he may explain it thoroughly to the Philippine people.

"Señor BARRETO. I wish to add a few words to those spoken by my companion. The Philippine people have lived under an illusion in the hope of independence, and General Aguinaldo wishes that this hope may be realized in full, or that the people act by their own will in case the hope is not realized.

"President SCHURMAN. What hope?

"Señor BARRETO. The people have lived under this illusion, and in order that he may explain and make clear this proposition there should be a meeting of the representatives of the Philippine people to make plain this form of government.

"President SCHURMAN. A reunion of the people in their congress?

"Señor BARRETO. Exactly.

"President SCHURMAN. Have you not just had a meeting of your congress, Señor Barreto?

"Señor BARRETO. We have had a meeting, but there was not a sufficient number present to represent the people. On account of our being in a state of war, some of the representatives were in one province, some in another, and they were not able to meet; for that reason General Aguinaldo has to beg a cessation of hostilities, in order to call a meeting.

"Professor WORCESTER. He didn't say that. He did not say anything about a cessation of hostilities. He probably will.

"Mr. GREEN (interpreter). That is the substance of what he said, He said to 'stop the war.'

"Señor BARRETO. We wish to suspend hostilities, for without a suspension of hostilities, as the gentlemen will understand, it is impossible to have a meeting.

"Professor WORCESTER. How many men did you get together, as a matter of fact?

"President SCHURMAN. How many persons were present at your congress?

"Señor BARRETO. Fifteen.

"President SCHURMAN. How many make a quorum?

‘Señor BARRETO. There should be at least 32 present. There are 110 members. In order to hold a meeting they must have 55.

“Professor WORCESTER. I am free to say to them that, by the new rule, 16 can do business. We would like to know about that.

“President SCHURMAN. Haven’t they a new rule by which 16 make a quorum?

“Señor BARRETO. I am speaking according to our constitution. No. But General Aguinaldo wishes not only to explain to this congress, but also to all the elements, the living forces of the people—all the people themselves, including the military force—this plan of government.

“President SCHURMAN. Who are the living forces of the country?

“Señor BARRETO. The military forces and the most enlightened people of the towns; and for that reason we have been sent here to get the most complete and the greatest details of the plan of government which the American Government wishes to establish here; not the general lines, because we know those from the proclamation; for in the proclamation, which we have had the pleasure of reading since we came to Manila, there appeared nothing more than general lines on which the government will be established, which it is desired to establish. With this in view, we wish that the American commission would give us information about the plan of government which the President of the United States wishes to establish here.

“President SCHURMAN. It is here [referring to cablegram].* We submit it to you here to-day. This is a scheme which the President of the United States can put in force immediately. Of course, the final matter is in the hands of Congress, but the President can set up this government now and it will remain in force pending the action of Congress, and until Congress takes action—

“Señor BARRETO. That is to say, that this plan of government can be established here only for the present, but that the final plan of government must be established by resolutions of Congress.

“President SCHURMAN. This government would remain in force until Congress acted, and this commission, after consulting with these gentlemen, will recommend to Congress a permanent and definite form of government.

“Señor BARRETO. That is very true; but, of course, the plan of government will be a question for discussion by the Congress of the United States, and we will not be aware of what will be the

* See Appendix B to this pamphlet.

definite and permanent form of government for the Philippine Islands until Congress has made its decision.

"President SCHURMAN. Having this government in force, which can go in force to-morrow if we have peace, the Philippine people must trust this commission, the President of the United States, and Congress.

"Señor BARRETO. I do not comprehend.

"(President Schurman repeated his last statement.)

"Señor BARRETO. That is to say that this plan of government which will be submitted to us by the commission will be the plan to be enforced until the resolution of Congress.

"President SCHURMAN. Two things are to be said. First, this government will remain in force until Congress acts, and Congress need not take action this year or next year; and secondly, this commission is here for the express purpose of finding out what form of government the Philippine people desire and then making recommendations to Congress regarding the permanent form of government which they desire and which they will approve. We are here to find out what form of government you desire, and then to make recommendations thereon to Congress.

"Señor BARRETO. The idea is, then, that you are to recommend the plan of government which you have considered here for a final plan of government?

"President SCHURMAN. Yes.

"Señor BARRETO. This is the plan of government which is to be in force until the action of Congress?

"Colonel DENBY. It is the plan we propose, but we are willing to listen to you and find out what ideas you have on the subject.

"Señor GONZAGA. We can not make suggestions, because perhaps our suggestions would not be acceptable to you, but what we desire is to take the plan of government which you have studied up and have thought fit for the people, to take it into our own territory and submit it to our people, and if any changes in this plan of government seem necessary or proper to bring back the plan here with these suggestions.

"President SCHURMAN. We will give you a copy of this plan of the President's for such consideration.

"Señor GONZAGA. This plan is provisional, as we understand. This plan is provisional until such time as Congress acts, and we understand also that President McKinley has sent this commission

here to the islands to consider and study a plan of government for them, and we understand that the form of government which you think proper to establish here will be the plan of government which President McKinley will submit to Congress, and if it meets the approval of Congress it is to be the definite form for the country, and we wish to submit this plan of government which you have thought proper for the islands to our people, with the end in view of establishing peace.

“President SCHURMAN. The President of the United States thought it more important to provide a definite scheme of government for the present which should be established at once.

“Señor GONZAGA. We are not speaking of the plan of government which is to be enforced at present, but of the plan of government which will be recommended as the permanent plan.

“President SCHURMAN. Until a permanent form of government shall be developed, if this plan be once established and successful it will be the plan of government, and our commission and the President of the United States desire to have this form set up now in order that peace being thereby established the commission may have the benefit of the advice of the distinguished gentlemen who are now in arms against the United States. Let us stop the fighting, set up this form of government, and then get together and agree as to a future and permanent one. Consequently, this scheme of the President's is a first and necessary step. It does not matter how long we fight, whether we fight one month, one year, or ten years. The settlement of this question will be on us then as well as now. You can not resist our fighting and you may as well come in at once and help us get a constitution, but you must stop fighting in order to get the question settled. The first step is for you to stop fighting, the second a provisional form of government, the third a definite form of government, and finally —

“Señor GONZAGA. For this reason we have come here to put an end to the war, and to put the provisional form of government before the people for their consideration.

“President SCHURMAN. There is a difference. We want not a suspension of hostilities, but an absolute cessation, a termination of fighting, and General Aguinaldo can bring the fighting to an end at once. That is what we want. And war being terminated, next day this form of government can be implanted; and then, in the third place, consultation between the distinguished Philippine

gentlemen and our commission regarding the permanent and definite form of government to be recommended to our Congress. And if you stop fighting, you run no risk regarding the temporary form of government, for the President of the United States has outlined it; and as to the ultimate form of government, you do not run any great risk, because, as you know, the President's idea is embodied in the provisional form of government; and you know the intention of this commission; and this commission desires to satisfy the Philippine people so far as possible.

"Señor BARRETO. That is to say, it is always a possibility —

"President SCHURMAN. You must trust us, as we will have to trust you. There is the possibility of deception; but it is not the policy of this commission or of the United States to deceive anybody.

"Señor BARRETO. But we have wished to know how the commission would cease hostilities. Our desire is that peace should be eternal, and a good feeling should be eternal between the United States and the Philippine people.

"President SCHURMAN. They can terminate the war by accepting the President's plan of government. You here have peace with honor. Stop fighting, and here is an excellent scheme of government provided by the President of the United States for you. Peace with dignity.

"Señor BARRETO. You wish to say, then, that if we accept this plan of government all hostilities will be at an end?

"President SCHURMAN. We wish to say that if you stop fighting you can have this form of government. You have the word of the President of the United States.

"Señor BARRETO. What I understood you to say in the first place was that if we accepted this plan of government hostilities would cease immediately.

"President SCHURMAN. No; I said there were three steps we had to consider. The first was your stopping fighting; the second, the President of the United States setting up this form of government, and the President would do it as soon as you stop fighting.

"Señor BARRETO. Then, in the first place we must stop the war, and in the second place this plan of government will be established, and in the third place there would be the study, the consultation, and recommendations to Congress. I understand, then, that in the first place we are to stop the war, in the second place that this

form of provisional government will be established, and in the third place that this form of government being in force we are to advise with and consult with the commission about the final form of the government which they will recommend to President McKinley, and which he will recommend to Congress as the final form of government for these islands.

"President SCHURMAN. I should want to add to that statement this other: This commission will, so far as it is by any means possible, desire to meet the views and wishes of the distinguished Filipinos regarding their permanent form of government, subject only and always to the fact of American sovereignty. We are very anxious to come to an understanding with you, but only under one condition, the fact of American sovereignty.

"Señor BARRETO. You wish, then, to hear the desires of enlightened Filipinos about the definite form of government, always considering the sovereignty of America?

"President SCHURMAN. After we have secured peace and the provisional form of government is established, because it is not possible to get the views of all these people until peace is settled; that is what we want.

"Señor BARRETO. And that is why we have come.

"President SCHURMAN. Why don't you stop fighting, then.

"Señor BARRETO. For that reason we have come now in order that we may explain to the people the plan of government which you propose.

"President SCHURMAN. How does the President's scheme of government please you?

"Señor BARRETO. We have still to consider it, to study it, and our intelligence is not sufficient to answer the question at the moment, on the spur. There are many complicated questions and you, Mr. Schurman, will understand that we cannot give an answer immediately.

"President SCHURMAN. We think you underrate your own intelligence.

"Señor BARRETO. Mr. Schurman, you pay us a compliment, but you know that we are not capable of giving an immediate answer. What we desire is to study this plan and give an answer later.

"President SCHURMAN. We have already outlined almost the same scheme to a former commissioner of General Aguinaldo.

"SEÑOR BARRETO. Our desire at present is to know the details for the plan of government, and to know in what manner the commission wishes the war to be brought to an end.

"PRESIDENT SCHURMAN. When Colonel Arguelles came in he said the Filipinos 'want peace with honor.' We said to him there is necessary for peace only this: The recognition of American sovereignty; second, an understanding regarding the form of government, which this commission would want to reach with leading Filipinos; and Colonel Arguelles wanted from us some definite statement regarding the form of government proposed, and we telegraphed to Washington and the President of the United States sent back this.

"SEÑOR BARRETO. But not in the nature of a definite form of government; only for a provisional form.

"PRESIDENT SCHURMAN. Until Congress acts the President can not do more, and you must trust the President now.

"SEÑOR BARRETO. Now, we should like to know from the commission how the war should be terminated.

"PRESIDENT SCHURMAN. We wish General Aguinaldo to stop fighting immediately.

"SEÑOR BARRETO. Well, we are the people attacked. How can we stop fighting? We are doing nothing more than defending ourselves.

"PRESIDENT SCHURMAN. Lay down your arms and the war will stop immediately. The way to end the war is for you to lay down your arms, and the details, that being a military question, are all in the hands of General Otis.

"SEÑOR BARRETO. We understand that this question is not purely a military question, but it is a question both military and civil; and peace once having been established and hostilities suspended we could send a representative to the commission to consult and agree about a definite form of government, meanwhile remaining in our own territory with our own form of government.

"PRESIDENT SCHURMAN. We could not recognize any such form of government.

"SEÑOR BARRETO. We do not ask a recognition implied or in fact of our government; what we wish is a return to the state of affairs in existence before the 4th of February.

"COLONEL DENBY. If we take a hundred years we will still have these questions with us. Why not settle them now?

"Señor BARRETO. We wish that, for we understand that because of the generous wishes of the American commission we could arrive at a definite end.

"President SCHURMAN. I think he said, 'We want to know what form the general sentiment of the American commission will take.'

"Señor BARRETO. For returning to the condition of affairs as they were before the 4th of February we consider that we shall be in a better position to arrive at a good understanding of the generous impulses and sentiments of the American commission than we are at present.

"President SCHURMAN. That is a military question on which the commission could not undertake to express an opinion. This commission can tell the Philippine people on behalf of the President of the United States what kind of government he is ready to give them, but we have nothing to do with the military question.

"Señor BARRETO. But the commission could order that we may arrive at the end which we both desire — that is, peace and a definite form of government.

"Señor GONZAGA. The gentlemen of the commission have expressed their desire to hear the opinion of the enlightened people in the country about the form of government which is to be established, and we understand that the good desire of the gentlemen of the commission can not be attained without a cessation of hostilities.

"President SCHURMAN. Of course we can hear people who come to us, but we very much prefer fighting should cease.

"Señor GONZAGA. Then the difficulty arises, in the first place — the people who are fighting at present can not come into our lines, because they are in battle, and they should also be hurt. In the second place, there are many people who have retired to distant places and can not come because they are in peace there in these distant places; and in the third place, there are many unforeseen things which come up in a state of war, things which can not be foreseen by either side, and which have a tendency to cause bitterness on both sides. For instance, the American Army may say we have not followed the line of conduct which should be observed according to the rules of war, and this naturally leads to bitterness on our side.

"President SCHURMAN. If General Aguinaldo and two or three of his most prominent generals came in and sat down at this table

as you are here, we believe this whole business could be settled. For example, some of his military men, some of his secretaries, and some of his prominent civil advisers; for example, Señor Paterno the head of the cabinet, whose book I have been studying. They know the sentiments of all their people and their moral influence, and sitting at this table we could settle the thing in a day.

“Señor GONZAGA. General Aguinaldo has no other desire than the prosperity of his country, and he wishes to settle this plan of government, and he wishes to submit this plan of government to his people in order to be exempt from any responsibility afterwards; for it is possible that if he simply says I wish this or I wish that and it does not turn out well afterwards the people may say that he is to blame.

“President SCHURMAN. General Aguinaldo cannot have any stronger desire for the welfare, prosperity, and happiness of the Philippine people than we.

“Señor GONZAGA. I thank you on behalf of myself and my companions.

“President SCHURMAN. And if General Aguinaldo, with half a dozen of his leading military and civil advisers, sat here, I am persuaded we could end this matter immediately.

“Señor BARRETO. To this we may answer that the wish of General Aguinaldo and of his advisers would never be the wish of the entire Philippine people.

“President SCHURMAN. The answer to that is that General Aguinaldo does not begin to control the entire archipelago.

“Señor BARRETO. We shall inform General Aguinaldo as to what the desires of the commission in this respect are.

“Professor WORCESTER. It is customary for people who have a controlling influence in a country to assume responsibility. They are trying to assume it in the possession of the government; and they ought to assume it now.

“President SCHURMAN. General Aguinaldo and his leaders are taking the initiative in this war. If they come here and agree with us we would run the risk for all the rest of the people agreeing with him. For that reason it is not necessary to call all the people of the archipelago into conference. It is not possible to do it. We have already had communications from many provinces saying they are waiting only for the action of General Aguinaldo; for an agreement between General Aguinaldo and ourselves.

"Señor BARRETO. We can not give a definite answer to this, but will propose it to General Aguinaldo. For we do not know whether he would wish to come here, or would accept this responsibility.

"President SCHURMAN. Of course, they would come here as private individuals, but it would give us the greatest pleasure to welcome them, and the communications which we have from other provinces show that the Philippine people are very desirous that General Aguinaldo should reach an agreement with the commission.

"Señor BARRETO. We could not assume the responsibility of answering for General Aguinaldo whether he would be willing to come here and assume that responsibility, but we will lay the matter before him. We first desire from the commission their intercession with General Otis in favor of an arrangement for a cessation of hostilities in order that this agreement may be reached.

"President SCHURMAN. The commission, under its instructions from the President, could not mix in any way with military affairs.

"Señor BARRETO. What we wish the commission to do is not to act in this military matter, but only to intercede for us, seconding the favorable desires of the President.

"President SCHURMAN. We think that we have supplied the Philippine people with an honorable reason for laying down their arms, viz: This liberal form of government which the President of the United States offers them and the proclamation of the commission. The President's programme and the proclamation assure the people of the Philippine Islands the most liberal form of government that they have ever had.

"Señor BARRETO. Any government is more liberal than Spanish government. I do not refer especially to autonomy, but any government whatever is more liberal than the Spanish form of government.

"President SCHURMAN. The President's programme and scheme of government is exceedingly liberal.

"Señor BARRETO. If I am allowed to speak it is a very liberal programme of government, but more liberal forms of government could exist.

"President SCHURMAN. We have promised in our proclamation an ever increasing freedom.

"Señor GONZAGA. Yes, liberty very much greater.

"President SCHURMAN. What more liberal form do you suggest?

"Señor BARRETO. I would desire a form of government more liberal than anything that has been proposed so far.

"President SCHURMAN. In what respect?

"Señor BARRETO. In all the departments named.

"President SCHURMAN. Kindly explain in detail.

"Señor BARRETO. We can not explain this in detail at present, for we have not come charged with this mission.

"President SCHURMAN. You say the President's programme is not sufficiently liberal, and yet you won't tell us what form of liberal government you desire.

"Señor BARRETO. As members of this commission we can not explain ourselves in detail, but can only say for the present that while this is a liberal programme, there might exist other programmes more liberal. This is a much more liberal plan of government than that of the Spanish. It is like comparing heaven and earth.

"President SCHURMAN. I think it rather hard that you criticise the President's scheme as not liberal enough, and yet will not indicate any points in which it ought to be more liberal.

"Señor BARRETO. The members of this commission were not authorized to do so. We are only authorized as members of this commission to hear the proposition of the American commission.

"President SCHURMAN. Then I infer the power which authorized you may think the President's scheme is more liberal than you think it to be.

"Señor BARRETO. As private individuals, and not as members of the commission, I or any one of my colleagues can say that we consider this plan very liberal and very suitable for the country.

"President SCHURMAN. I want to put aside all minor questions and come to the principal point. The fundamental point is this: We all desire peace.

"Señor GONZAGA. Undoubtedly.

"President SCHURMAN. For you two courses are open, and only two. In the first place, you can go on fighting. In that case you will ultimately be beaten by the superior power of the United States, and the chances of getting good terms then will not be so good as they are at present. The second course is this: You can stop fighting at once, and in the Philippines the scheme of government authorized by the President will be set up. Meantime this commission will consult with your leading men and endeavor to

reach a form of government satisfactory to you. The question for you to decide is this: Which course is it more profitable for you to pursue?

"Señor BARRETO. The second road is undoubtedly the better road for us to follow, and for that reason we have come to propose peace, and for the thousand reasons which we have stated to General Otis. For war being continued, the good feeling would be diminished and hatred would be increased, for the death of one individual affects all his relatives. For this reason we desire a cessation of war. America will lose nothing by the cessation of hostilities. America knows with her power that she can annihilate all of our forces. We understand that the United States, by its superior force, can reconquer the country, although by doing so it will cause death and cause hatred, but we have come to bring peace about, so that the Philippine people should not lose and shall not be prejudiced in the settlement.

"President SCHURMAN. The Philippine people are protected by the President's form of government and by the commission's proclamation.

"Señor BARRETO. We wish also to add that this cessation of hostilities would reassure the people a great deal; they would understand then that the United States wished nothing but their best interest. The Philippine people would so be better convinced of the lofty and generous sentiments and desires of the American people, having it in their power to suppress them and at the same time coming to an amicable agreement.

"President SCHURMAN. A general who makes war and continues war has also a right to stop it. Is it not true, General del Pilar?

"General DEL PILAR. Yes.

"President SCHURMAN. And consequently General Aguinaldo has that power.

"Señor BARRETO. But as there are two generals, two different commands, although one might stop war the other might not.

"General DEL PILAR. Add also that we did nothing but defend ourselves. We are the people attacked.

"President SCHURMAN. In reply to General del Pilar we must say that we do not admit that. We reject that statement, but it is a matter of history and we will not discuss it here.

"Professor WORCESTER. The translation was not correct. He

said there are two generals, one of whom desires peace and the other does not.

"President SCHURMAN. Are there two generals, one desiring peace and the other desiring war ?

"Señor BARRETO. No; you (turning to Professor Worcester) did not understand me. What I said was, as there were two generals in the question, one general would not assume without the other to keep any peace until they came to an agreement.

"President SCHURMAN. In such a case somebody has to stop fighting, and among civilized nations it is always the one which is beaten, as, for instance, Spain.

"Señor BARRETO. I don't understand that it is absolutely necessary to put an end to war that one army should be conquered. An arrangement can be made between both armies before one is conquered.

"President SCHURMAN. Generally, one is getting the worst of it, and the general who is getting the worst of it has sense enough to know that they are going to be beaten and gives up his arms as was done in the recent war with Spain, especially when the conquered party, the one that is being beaten, can get all his reasonable desires.

"Señor BARRETO. This would be a great humiliation to our army. For our army has shed its blood in order to destroy the Spanish Government in making common cause with the Americans.

"President SCHURMAN. They have dimmed the luster and obscured the glory of that by fighting the United States.

"General DEL PILAR. What can you expect of us when we are attacked ?

"President SCHURMAN. I have already denied that assertion. We do not want to go into that question here. We have come here to make peace and to supply and furnish a free government for the people and we want them to regard us in that light.

"Señor BARRETO. In this way we wish to regard you.

"President SCHURMAN. If you will stop fighting it is the opinion of this commission that there is no reasonable doubt about satisfying your desires. By "stop fighting" we mean lay down your arms. Can you find educated Filipinos who are fit for counselors and judges ?

"Señor BARRETO. I believe so. In some of the districts it would be difficult to find people from the district itself suitable, because

there are some districts where there is no enlightenment—for instance in Mindanao—but doubtless in the islands would be found people perfectly fit for these positions; for under the Spanish Government, although the chiefs of the Government were Spanish, the whole weight of the administration of these different departments was borne by Filipinos.

“President SCHURMAN. The policy of the United States and of the President of the United States will be to appoint Filipinos to all offices which they are qualified to fill—post-offices, custom-houses, and other offices, secretaries, and mayors of cities. Naturally the direction would be in the hands of Americans, but we do not expect that a large number of Americans will be necessary at all.

“Señor BARRETO. In all branches of the administration, then, as for example, the treasury, Filipinos of ability will have admission?

“President SCHURMAN. Filipinos of ability and good character will have the preference.

“Señor BARRETO. And how will the judicial power be organized?

“President SCHURMAN. I repeat that the direction will naturally be in the hands of the Americans. The heads of this department will naturally be Americans. The courts will be composed of both Americans and Filipinos. The President says either Americans or Filipinos, or both, and also the judges. And now General Otis is establishing civil courts and the majority of the judges are to be Filipinos; and I want you to judge of the action of the United States in the future by what General Otis is doing now and by what the President sets forth in his telegram and we in our proclamation; and in the same way we should desire to have, as soon as it is practicable, Filipinos for police service and for a local army, if a local army were necessary—a local militia.

“Señor BARRETO. Are all the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands subject to the jurisdiction of these courts?

“President SCHURMAN. Do you refer to the courts General Otis is about establishing?

“Señor BARRETO. Yes; to those provisional courts when he establishes them.

“President SCHURMAN. All over whom we have effective jurisdiction, and the plan of the President contemplates courts with Filipinos and Americans as judges, which shall have jurisdiction over the entire archipelago.

"Señor BARRETO. There will not be any duality of courts?"

"President SCHURMAN. No; we desire to have the same courts for the entire archipelago and for all citizens and residents, and that is one reason why it is necessary to have some American judges in order to satisfy the foreigners. Mixed tribunals, rather. We have had the idea of keeping, for the time being at least, the laws in force as codified by Spain, subject, of course, to change whenever change is necessary.

"Señor BARRETO. Of course that should be done.

"The meeting here adjourned."

[NOTE. Below are given extracts from an interview with Señor Melliza, who came to the Commission as a private individual on the 14th of May, 1899. This pamphlet is already so long that it seems inexpedient to reprint the interview in full, but a few passages of especial interest are quoted.]

[Report of the Philippine Commission, Vol. II, Page 94.]

"Testimony of Senor Melliza.

"MANILA, May 14, 1899.

"Q. [By President SCHURMAN.] Do you think the Philippine people are ready to accept American sovereignty? That is the important point.—A. The people are so accustomed to being deceived by the Spanish that when a thing is told them they wish to be told all about it. For my part, I understand what sovereignty is, but they do not, and they think that sovereignty might be something bad for them.

"Q. What do you think of this form of government being put into effect at once, supposing we had peace to-morrow, to wit: A governor-general for the archipelago, appointed by President of the United States; heads of departments (secretaries) appointed by the governor-general; all the important judges appointed by the President of the United States; these judges and heads of departments to be either Americans or Filipinos, or both; and, lastly, a consultative or general advisory body which should be elected by the people; the governor-general to have the power to

veto without waiting for the action of Congress ; the suffrage of the people to be hereafter determined.—A. For our part—that is, for the more enlightened people—the form of government does not make so much difference as the acts of the government. For example, the monarchy of Great Britain, under the rule of Queen Victoria, is much more desirable than the Republic of Chile.

“Q. You have asked us for a scheme of government, something that would satisfy you. Now I ask you, as a hypothesis, how that form of government would satisfy you, supposing it went into effect to-morrow and lasted until Congress took action?—A. For the enlightened people the form of government itself would not make much difference, but for the common people who are very much inflamed and arrayed against the Spanish Government, and have the idea of not being governed at all except by themselves, the plan will be very difficult. It will be very difficult to get this plan into their heads.

“Q. But, in the first place, if we can satisfy the enlightened people, we shall expect them to convince the masses of the people that it is good ; and secondly, under this scheme of government as outlined, Filipinos may have positions as heads of departments and as judges, and I suppose all the positions in the general advisory council.—A. I have said what I have simply with regard to the truth, and for no private interests on my part, for I now live a very retired life on a plantation of my own, and in order to make me President of Viscayas they had to threaten me with a revolver. General Miller asked me to be provost-marshal-general of Iloilo, and I refused. I simply wish to tell the truth as fairly as I know how.

“Q. Of course, this plan is a scheme of general government for the Archipelago. The plan of government for the various provinces and islands we are not prepared to suggest even as a hypothesis yet. We are studying it.—A. I am now going to tell the commission in order that they may understand fully the causes of the resistance in this country.

“Q. We want just that and we will be obliged to you for it. A. What the country wants is that the country itself shall be the one to dictate its laws ; it wishes to be the one to execute its laws by means of functionaries who shall be natives. It furthermore wishes that the United States should only appoint a governor who

shall watch the country and see whether the country fulfill perfectly what the laws have promised.

“Q. What powers would you give that governor-general?

A. The power of a protector and the power to interfere in case the country does not fulfill its laws as it has made them; to dictate the fulfillment of the law in internal affairs, that is what we want. We are willing to leave international affairs to the governor-general. In international affairs we are willing to leave everything to America.”

[Page 98.]

“Señor MELLIZA. I am simply explaining to the commission the causes that produced this war, in order that it may not seem strange that the war broke out.

“Q. We understand it to be a fact that Aguinaldo had received \$400,000, and that he and a number of his chief people had left and made peace, and that there was no insurrection here when Commodore Dewey came here on May 1st.—A. I don't know about this because I was in the Provinces at the time. I only say what is said in the newspapers and what I hear. I will answer this. I understand that peace may be made at any moment, when the desire of the United States of America, which is also the desire of the Philippine people, is explained. The Philippine people still are ignorant of what the United States wishes of them, and the only way the Philippine people have of judging is from some Spanish newspapers and from conversations with Spaniards and friars, and the Philippine people suspect that what the United States wish is to substitute their own rule in the place of that of the Spaniards.

“By Professor WORCESTER.

“Q. What newspapers are producing this effect?—A. All the periodicals which are published in the islands and in Madrid from April of last year until peace was concluded with the United States. Especially *El Comercio* in Manila, and the *Porvenir de Visayas*. In the second place the American squadron having come, and General Otis's proclamation having been issued, the Philippine military element was excited and somewhat unfriendly, and put a wrong interpretation on it. And this element said that if the Americans had to protect the Philippine Islands they should not have given them arms and taken their possession; that it would

have been better to allow the Filipinos to constitute their own government, organize their own government, here in Manila, where the Americans had their administration. They could then observe this government, and see whether the Filipinos carried it on well or not, and if the government went on ill they could interfere, but for the moment this element said, America did not allow them to try whether they were able or not to carry on a good government; she showed her intention of taking possession of all the islands. This is what the people believe, but I personally understand that it is a mistaken idea. I think that we have explained all the reasons and the causes of the war.

“Q. War having been caused in this way, how is peace to be restored at once?—A. By putting into practice at once the good intentions of the Americans for the Philippine people, who have been accustomed to being cheated by the Spaniards. It is necessary for the Philippine people, who have seen the Spaniards do not fulfill their promises, to see that the American people intend to keep faith with them.”

APPENDICES.

A

Proclamation issued by the Commission April 4, 1899.

[REPORT OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION, VOL. I, PAGE 5.]

[The preamble is an expression of general good-will and honorable intentions. The body of the proclamation is as follows:]

"In the meantime the attention of the Philippine people is invited to certain regulation principles by which the United States will be guided in its relations with them.

"The following are deemed of cardinal importance:

"1. The supremacy of the United States must and will be enforced throughout every part of the Archipelago, and those who resist it can accomplish no end other than their own ruin.

"2. The most ample liberty of self-government will be granted to the Philippine people which is reconcilable with the maintenance of a wise, just, stable, effective and economical administration of public affairs, and compatible with the sovereign and international rights and obligations of the United States.

"3. The civil rights of the Philippine people will be guaranteed and protected to the fullest extent; religious freedom assured, and all persons shall have an equal standing before the law.

"4. Honor, justice, and friendship forbid the use of the Philippine people or islands as an object or means of exploitation. The purpose of the American government is the welfare and advancement of the Philippine people.

"5. There shall be guaranteed to the Philippine people an honest and effective civil service, in which, to the fullest extent practicable, natives shall be employed.

"6. The collection and application of taxes and revenues will be put upon a sound, honest, and economical basis. Public funds, raised justly and collected honestly, will be applied only in defraying the regular and proper expenses incurred by and for the establishment and maintenance of the Philippine government, and for such general improvements as public interests may demand.

Local funds, collected for local purposes, shall not be diverted to other ends. With such a prudent and honest fiscal administration, it is believed that the needs of the government will in a short time become compatible with a considerable reduction in taxation.

“7. A pure, speedy, and effective administration of justice will be established, whereby the evils of delay, corruption, and exploitation will be effectually eradicated.

“8. The construction of roads, railroads, and other means of communication and transportation, as well as other public works of manifest advantage to the Philippine people, will be promoted.

“9. Domestic and foreign trade and commerce, agriculture, and other industrial pursuits, and the general development of the country in the interest of its inhabitants will be the constant objects of solicitude and fostering care.

“10. Effective provision will be made for the establishment of elementary schools in which the children of the people shall be educated. Appropriate facilities will also be provided for higher education.

“11. Reforms in all departments of the government, in all branches of the public service, and in all corporations closely touching the common life of the people must be undertaken without delay, and affected, conformably to right and justice, in a way that will satisfy the well-founded demands and the highest sentiments and aspirations of the Philippine people.”

B

The President's Cablegram of May 5, 1899.

[REPORT OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION, VOL. I, PAGE 9.]

“WASHINGTON, May 5, 1899.

“SCHURMAN, Manila:

“Yours 4th received. You are authorized to propose that under the military power of the President, pending action of Congress, government of the Philippine Islands shall consist of a Governor-General appointed by the President; cabinet appointed by the Governor-General; a general advisory council elected by the people; the qualifications of electors to be carefully considered and determined; and the Governor-General to have absolute veto.

Judiciary strong and independent; principal judges to be appointed by the President. The cabinet and judges to be chosen from natives or Americans, or both, having regard to fitness. The President earnestly desires the cessation of bloodshed, and that the people of the Philippine Islands at an early date shall have the largest measure of local self-government consistent with peace and good order.

HAY."

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L. K. FULLER, 12 Otis Place, Boston.

Treasurer.

WILLIAM H. McELWAIN, 84 Essex Building, Boston.

Contributions from one dollar upwards are solicited from any one desiring to aid in defraying expenses, and may be sent to the Treasurer, WILLIAM H. McELWAIN, 84 Essex Building, Boston.

Persons joining this Society as members are expected :

1. To inform themselves, as fully and as accurately as possible, as to the true state of affairs in the Philippine Islands.

2. To circulate accurate information, by informal conversation, by inducing others to study the facts collected, and by sending to the Secretary the names of people who may be thought to be interested.

Any one desiring to become a member is asked to send his name and address to L. K. FULLER, 12 Otis Place, Boston.